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515 
SOME KIND OF HEARING OFFICER 
Kent H. Barnett 
Abstract: In his prominent 1975 law-review article, “Some Kind of Hearing,” Second 
Circuit Judge Henry Friendly explored how courts and agencies should respond when the 
Due Process Clause required—in the U.S. Supreme Court’s exceedingly vague words—
“some kind of hearing.” That phrase led to the familiar Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, 
under which courts weigh three factors to determine how much process or formality is due. 
But the U.S. Supreme Court has never applied Mathews to another, often ignored, facet of 
due process: the requirement for impartial adjudicators. As it turns out, Congress and 
agencies have broad discretion to fashion not only “some kind of hearing” but also some kind 
of hearing officer. 
Scholars, Congress, and even federal agencies have largely ignored so-called “informal” 
agency hearings and the hearing officers who preside over them, despite their large number 
and significance. Unlike well-known administrative law judges, the lack of uniform 
treatment of and data on these federal hearing officers renders it difficult to monitor, 
compare, and improve the systemic design and fairness of informal hearings. To better 
understand this “hidden judiciary,” this Article first reports, based on rare access to agencies, 
the most comprehensive empirical data assembled on those adjudicators’ independence. The 
data confirm the significant variety of federal hearing officers and the lack of uniform 
impartiality protections. To improve data collection, transparency, and salience of these 
hearing officers, this Article proposes a disclosure framework—appropriated from consumer 
contexts—to detect, compare, and improve prophylaxes to protect hearing officers from 
improper agency influence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Agency adjudication gets little attention. But when it does, the alleged 
unfairness of the proceedings is usually at issue. Take the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) as an initial example. Encouraged by 
statistical findings reported in the New York Times and the Wall Street 
Journal, parties in SEC proceedings criticized the SEC’s adjudicators for 
favoring their agency during “in house” proceedings.1 This criticism of 
                                                     
1. See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins with In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2015, 10:30 
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803 (last visited Apr. 2, 
2019); Gretchen Morgenson, At the S.E.C., A Question of Home-Court Edge, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 
2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/business/at-the-sec-a-question-of-home-court-
edge.html [https://perma.cc/B98D-7WAT] (contrasting SEC’s 88% win rate in administrative law 
judge (ALJ) hearings to 63% win rate in district courts). That said, Urska Velikonja has argued that 
a proper interpretation of the data, including summary dispositions, indicates that the SEC ALJs 
were not biased. See generally Urska Velikonja, Are the SEC’s Administrative Law Judges Biased? 
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the SEC led prominent U.S. District Judge (and SEC detractor) Jed 
Rakoff to take note, remarking that the SEC had won 100% of its 
administrative actions in 2014 as compared to 61% in court.2 Moreover, 
a former SEC administrative law judge stated that the agency had 
“questioned [her] loyalty to the SEC” because she ruled against the 
agency.3 
As another example, Department of Justice officials in the George W. 
Bush Administration were accused of unlawfully hiring and firing 
immigration judges based on their political views.4 And indeed, a later 
investigation confirmed the politicized hiring.5 Around this time, federal 
judges criticized immigration judges for their lack of professionalism 
and impartiality.6 Although the Justice Department has reformed its 
hiring practices,7 immigration judges have recently made news again 
when the Trump Administration sought to impose aggressive case-
processing goals and affirmance rates, which judges must meet or face 
                                                     
An Empirical Investigation, 92 WASH. L. REV. 315 (2017). Velikonja could not say how strong the 
SEC’s cases were in either forum. See id. at 363–64. Another empirical study concluded that “the 
SEC [is] shifting more marginal cases from court to administrative proceedings or bringing actions 
as administrative proceedings that would not have been brought at all pre-Dodd-Frank.” Stephen J. 
Choi & A.C. Pritchard, The SEC’s Shift to Administrative Proceedings: An Empirical Assessment, 
34 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 32 (2017). 
2. Nate Raymond, U.S. Judge Criticizes SEC Use of In-House Court for Fraud Cases, REUTERS 
(Nov. 5, 2014, 10:47 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sec-fraud-rakoff/u-s-judge-criticizes-
sec-use-of-in-house-court-for-fraud-cases-idUSKBN0IP2EG20141105 [https://perma.cc/MQ33-
KKVD]; see Amended Complaint at 19–20, Hill v. SEC, No. 1:15-cv-01801-LMM (N.D. Ga. May 
29, 2015), 2015 WL 4307088. 
3. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins with In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2015, 10:30 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803 (last visited Apr. 20, 
2019). Other ALJs at other agencies have made similar complaints. See Robert J. McCarthy, 
Blowing in the Wind: Answers for Federal Whistleblowers, 3 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 184, 213 
(2012) (collecting cases). 
4. See, e.g., Donald S. Dobkin, The Rise of the Administrative State: A Prescription for 
Lawlessness, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 362, 380–81 (2008) (citing Carol Marin, Patronage 
“Crime” Does Pay — for Justice Dept., CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 25, 2007, at B6); Amy Goldstein & 
Dan Eggen, Immigration Judges Often Picked Based on GOP Ties, WASH. POST (June 11, 2007), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/10/AR2007061001229.html 
[https://perma.cc/5D4H-S8R6]. 
5. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY 
MONICA GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (July 28, 
2008), https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0807/final.pdf [https://perma.cc/59D7-M3J6] [hereinafter 
ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING]. 
6. See Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005) (collecting cases from other 
circuits). 
7. See ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING, supra note 5, at 65. 
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firing.8 For those judges with dockets that include numerous time-
consuming immigration claims,9 they will be incentivized to have 
limited hearings and to deny claims. Recently, President Trump, 
annoyed by the immigration court backlog, went so far as to argue that 
immigrants who arrive at the border and seek admission or asylum 
should receive no hearings,10 perhaps in contravention of due process.11 
Quickly denying claims is, in fact, the Trump Administration’s 
preference.12 
As a final example, the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has 
angered patent holders with its unique control over decisions by its 
Appellate Board (PTAB). The Director of the PTO does not have direct 
decisionmaking authority,13 but the director can require rehearings for 
decisions from three-judge PTAB panels.14 On rehearing, the Director 
                                                     
8. Tal Kopan, Justice Department Rolls Out Case Quotas for Immigration Judges, CNN (Apr. 2, 
2018, 8:55 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/02/politics/immigration-judges-quota/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/RU8G-727B]; see also EOIR PERFORMANCE PLAN: ADJUDICATIVE EMPLOYEES, 
http://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/2018/images/04/02/immigration-judges-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7CU-
CLWE]. 
9. See Russell Wheeler, Amid Turmoil on the Border, New DOJ Policy Encourages Immigration 
Judges to Cut Corners, BROOKINGS (June 18, 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2018/06/18/amid-turmoil-on-the-border-new-doj-policy-
encourages-immigration-judges-to-cut-corners/ [https://perma.cc/S5WK-ABEQ] (discussing 
differences in dockets and realistic case-processing dockets for judges with different kinds of claims). 
10. See Donald J. Trump (@POTUS), TWITTER (June 25, 2018, 5:43 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1011228265003077632 [https://perma.cc/X6W5-7GQ8] 
(“Hiring manythousands [sic] of judges, and going through a long and complicated legal process, is 
not the way to go - will always be disfunctional [sic]. People must simply be stopped at the Border 
and told they cannot come into the U.S. illegally.”); Donald J. Trump (@POTUS), TWITTER (June 
25, 2018, 5:45 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1011231137233080321 
[https://perma.cc/G3TT-L24T] (“If this is done, illegal immigration will be stopped in it’s [sic] 
tracks - and at very little, by comparison, cost. This is the only real answer - and we must continue 
to BUILD THE WALL!”). 
11. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“But once an alien enters the country, 
the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the 
United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or 
permanent.”). 
12. See Kopan, supra note 8 (quoting former immigration judge Paul Schmidt saying, 
“[e]valuating somebody’s performance on the number of cases they close is obviously going to have 
some effect on the substance of the decisions. . . . [T]he boss wants removal orders, not grants—all 
those things have to have some sort of effect.”).  
13. See generally Christopher J. Walker & Melissa F. Wasserman, The New World of Agency 
Adjudication, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 141 (2019) (discussing the PTAB’s unique structure and its place 
within the traditional models of federal agency adjudication). 
14. Id. at 178 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 6(c) (2018)). 
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can add additional judges of his or her choosing and require additional 
rehearings until he or she gets the sought-after result.15 
What may come as a surprise is that the fairness of these 
proceedings—the matter at issue in each example—is largely left to 
Congress and the agencies to which Congress delegates. In a prominent 
1975 law review article, Second Circuit Judge Henry Friendly explored 
how courts and agencies should proceed when, in the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s words, the Due Process Clause mandates “some kind of 
hearing.”16 That phrase led to the familiar Mathews v. Eldridge17 
balancing test, in which courts consider three factors to determine how 
much process is due.18 
But the Court has never applied Mathews to another, often ignored, 
facet of due process that is at issue in the introductory examples: the 
requirement for impartial adjudicators.19 Due process, the Court has 
made clear, forbids an adjudicator from deciding cases in which the 
adjudicator has actual bias.20 Yet, because actual bias is difficult to 
detect, due process mostly considers the unconstitutional risks of 
partiality based on the adjudicator’s selection, professional and 
                                                     
15. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, USPTO Admits to Stacking PTAB Panels to Achieve Desired 
Outcomes, IPWATCHDOG (Aug. 23, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/08/23/uspto-admits-
stacking-ptab-panels-achieve-desired-outcomes/id=87206/ [https://perma.cc/95H8-ND4S] 
(discussing government’s concessions at oral argument in Yissum Research Dev. Co. v. Sony Corp., 
626 F. App’x 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). Former immigration judges and members of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals have recently claimed that the Department of Justice’s Executive Office of 
Immigration Review has taken a particular case from a local immigration judge and turned the case 
over to an Assistant Chief Immigration Judge to alter its outcome. After the local judge sought 
briefing on a particular issue, the matter was reassigned to the Assistant Chief Immigration Judge, 
who had the immigrant removed in absentia without briefing. STEVEN ABRAMS ET AL., AM. 
IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N, RETIRED IMMIGRATION JUDGES AND FORMER MEMBERS OF THE 
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO LATEST ATTACK ON JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE (2018), https://www.aila.org/infonet/retired-ijs-former-bia-mems-attack-on-jud-
independ [https://perma.cc/EJ8M-QMHX].  
16. Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing”, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1267 (1975) (quoting 
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557–58 (1974)) (“The Court has consistently held that some 
kind of hearing is required at some time before a person is finally deprived of his property 
interests.”). 
17. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
18. Id. at 334–35. 
19. In one of its impartiality decisions, the Court applied the Mathews framework, as one would 
expect, to a separate question of whether “additional administrative or judicial review” was 
necessary. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 198 (1982). But it did not apply those factors to the 
partiality questions. See id. at 195–97. 
20. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 883 (2009) (“The judge’s own inquiry 
into actual bias, then, is not one that the law can easily superintend or review, though actual bias, if 
disclosed, no doubt would be grounds for appropriate relief.”). 
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pecuniary interests, and other relationships to the parties.21 The Court’s 
few cases on partiality—especially in the federal administrative 
context22—leave the boundaries of due process opaque, even as the 
Court has expressed increased concern over adjudicators’ risk of 
partiality in various contexts.23 As a result, Congress and federal 
agencies have significant discretion to create not only “some kind of 
hearing” but also some kind of hearing officer. 
Federal administrative law judges (ALJs) are Congress’s best-known 
attempt to construct a cadre of adjudicators with optimal protections 
concerning impartiality—referred to as “impartiality protections” 
throughout this Article. ALJs number more than 1,90024 and oversee “on 
the record” (or, colloquially, “formal”) hearings.25 Drafted in 1946 
largely in response to concerns over unprofessional and partial federal 
agency adjudicators in the early twentieth century,26 the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) assigns responsibility for hiring ALJs to an 
independent agency, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM).27 The 
APA also applies impartiality protections—reminiscent of those that due 
process has considered, such as oversight, pay, and removal—to all 
                                                     
21. See id. at 883–84. 
22. The two most relevant decisions are McClure, 456 U.S. 188, and Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 
302 (1955). McClure held that the hiring of hearing officers by insurance companies to decide 
certain reimbursement claims did not create an unconstitutional risk of partiality because the 
government, not the employing insurers, paid any claims. McClure, 456 U.S. at 196. In Marcello, 
the Court rejected the partiality challenge against immigration hearing officers based on “the long-
standing practice in deportation proceedings, judicially approved in numerous decisions in the 
federal courts, and . . . the special considerations applicable to deportation which the Congress may 
take into account in exercising its particularly broad discretion in immigration matters.” Marcello, 
349 U.S. at 311. 
23. See, e.g., Caperton, 556 U.S. at 873 (holding that state supreme court justice had to recuse 
after one party to the appeal provided disproportionate donations to justice’s campaign); Williams-
Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1668 (2015) (recognizing state’s significant interest 
in preserving judicial appearance of impartiality when upholding Florida’s banning of judges from 
personally soliciting campaign donations); Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 
1910 (2016) (holding that unconstitutional risk of partiality exists when judge had earlier significant 
involvement in prosecution of defendant’s case). 
24. See Administrative Law Judges: ALJs By Agency, OPM.GOV, https://www.opm.gov/services-
for-agencies/administrative-law-judges/#url=ALJs-by-Agency [https://perma.cc/8FFU-D5JG] 
(listing 1931 ALJs by their agencies, as of March 2017). 
25. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2018); see also id. §§ 556, 3105. 
26. See Daniel J. Gifford, Federal Administrative Law Judges: The Relevance of Past Choices to 
Future Directions, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 3–9, 43–45 (1997). 
27. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 3105. 
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ALJs.28 As the earlier-mentioned loyalty check on a former SEC ALJ 
demonstrates, these protections may provide a necessary buffer from 
agency pressure. Notably, however, the Trump Administration has 
recently weakened them. For decades, OPM independently rated 
attorneys and required agencies to choose ALJs from a list of three 
candidates.29 The Administration, with OPM’s blessing, has now given 
agencies nearly complete discretion in choosing which lawyers to hire as 
ALJs.30 And the Administration has advocated for an expansive 
interpretation of “good cause” for ALJs’ removal.31 
But ALJs comprise only a fraction of administrative adjudicators. 
When it enacted the APA, Congress intended ALJs to preside over most 
federal agency evidentiary hearings.32 But doctrinal changes in the past 
decades, among other things, have permitted agencies to instead use 
non-ALJ hearing officers (“non-ALJs” or “hearing officers,” for short),33 
for whom Congress almost never provides guidance.34 Agencies are left 
in charge of protecting their hearing officers’ impartiality and their 
hearings’ fairness, even when the agency itself is a party to the dispute. 
Since at least the early 1990s, non-ALJs have outnumbered federal 
ALJs.35 But because these adjudicators go by numerous titles, oversee 
                                                     
28. See id. § 554(d) (providing limitations on certain ex parte contacts and supervision by certain 
agency officials); id. § 556(b) (requiring impartiality); id. § 3105 (providing ALJs separation of 
functions); id. § 7521 (limiting removal of ALJs). 
29. See VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: AN 
OVERVIEW 2–3 (2010). 
30. See Exec. Order No. 13,843, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,755 (July 13, 2018) [hereinafter Exec. Order]. 
The new process moves ALJs to the excepted service (thus not part of a competitive hiring process) 
and gives agency heads direct and nearly limitless discretion in hiring, subject to other statutory 
constraints. See infra Section I.C.1. 
31. See Memorandum from The Solicitor Gen. on Guidance on Admin. Law Judges after Lucia v. 
SEC (S. Ct.) to Agency Gen. Counsels 9 (on file with author). 
32. S. REP. NO. 752, at 207 (1946), reprinted in COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, at 268 (1947); U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 41–43 (1947) 
(arguing that formal adjudication applied to nearly all hearings required by statute). 
33. See Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643, 1662–65 
(2016). 
34. The most important exception is for certain Board of Contracts Appeals Judges, who have 
some or all of ALJs’ protections. All of those judges must be appointed like ALJs from a register by 
the hiring agency (although without OPM involvement). See 41 U.S.C. § 7105(a)(1), (b)(2), (d)(2) 
(2018). One group of theses judges has the same protection from at-will removal that ALJs have. Id. 
§ 7105(b)(3) (same protection as ALJs from at-will removal for Civilian Board of Contract Appeals 
Judges); id. § 7105(a) (no protection for Armed Services Board Judges); id. § 7105(c) (no protection 
for Tennessee Valley Authority Board Judges); id. § 7105(d) (no protection for Postal Service 
Board Judges). 
35. See infra Section II.B (discussing prior studies of non-ALJs). 
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various types of hearings for agencies across the federal administrative 
state, and lack uniform characteristics and protections, they toil away 
largely unnoticed. Their invisible nature leads to a vicious cycle: the 
government, aside from occasional scholarly projects,36 does not collect 
information on them, and without much information, they largely escape 
scholars’, policymakers’, and even regulated parties’ attention. 
Accordingly, non-ALJs, as Professor Paul Verkuil has said, are the 
federal government’s “hidden judiciary.”37 
This Article seeks to turn the vicious cycle into a virtuous one. In 
Part I, it first considers the need for impartiality protections. Fortunately, 
the Court’s due process jurisprudence and the APA identify important 
impartiality protections. 
From there, Part II presents a subset of empirical findings to 
determine whether non-ALJs (via statute or agency action) share similar 
impartiality protections with ALJs. Along with three co-authors 
(including two political scientists), I conducted research based on 
surveys of agencies and prepared and presented a report for the 
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), the 
independent federal agency charged with providing research and 
recommendations to Congress and agencies to improve the federal 
bureaucracy.38 
Our findings, in brief, demonstrate that non-ALJs’ prominence within 
the federal bureaucracy has grown significantly. First, agencies reported 
10,831 non-ALJs who go by twenty-three different titles. Non-ALJs 
outnumber the 1931 reported ALJs by more than 5:1.39 These non-ALJs 
hear a variety of matters, including hearings for regulatory enforcement, 
government-benefits, disputes between private parties, government 
contracts, licensing, and federal employment disputes.40 
                                                     
36. See infra note 142 (referring to the studies by Raymond Limon and John Frye). ACUS also 
sponsored the project from which the data reported in this article derives. 
37. Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections upon the Federal Administrative Judiciary, 39 UCLA L. REV. 
1341, 1345 (1992). 
38. See About, ADMIN. CONF. U.S., https://www.acus.gov/#node-7 [https://perma.cc/2HYX-
7XNM] (“ACUS is an independent federal agency charged with convening expert representatives 
from the public and private sectors to recommend improvements to administrative process and 
procedure.”). 
39. See infra Section II.B.2 (discussing how the “Limon Study” reported 3,370 non-ALJs and 
discussing the significant increase in patent examiners, the largest group of non-ALJs by a wide 
margin); infra tbl.1. 
40. For a thorough and thoughtful examination of administrative adjudication between two 
private parties, see Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Private Enforcement in Administrative Courts, 72 
VAND. L. REV. 425 (2019). 
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Non-ALJs’ impartiality protections were similarly heterogeneous. We 
asked agencies about, among other things, their hiring qualifications, 
limitations on non-adjudicatory duties, reporting relationships with the 
agency (a.k.a. “separation of functions”), limitations on ex parte 
communications, the non-ALJs’ physical separation within the agency, 
performance appraisals and eligibility for bonuses, and protection from 
at-will removal. We learned that agencies give some hearing officers 
significant forms of independence and others very little. Moreover, they 
often do so in ways, such as through custom or internal documents, 
which lack the transparency, clarity, and permanence of statutes or 
rulemaking.41 Indeed, certain responses to our survey indicated that 
current impartiality protections are for some agencies so opaque that the 
agency’s non-ALJs themselves are unaware of their precise contours. 
To obtain more useful data and assessments of other hearing officers, 
Part III proposes a uniform, one-page agency impartiality disclosure like 
those used in consumer transactions. As indicated in the draft disclosure 
in Appendix A, this uniform impartiality disclosure would be a single 
page with a table that identifies the existence (or not) of each protection, 
a brief description of and citation for each, and an opportunity to justify 
the absence of any factor. Agencies would send the disclosure to 
nonagency parties at the initiation of a hearing, post the disclosure online 
with their other hearing-related materials, and submit the original and 
revised forms to a clearinghouse—such as ACUS, which provides 
research and recommendations to agencies and Congress for synthesis 
and analysis. 
These disclosures will further numerous ends for Congress, the 
Executive Branch, and litigants in agency proceedings. First, disclosure 
will provide a synopsis of non-ALJs’ impartiality protections, 
information which might be dispersed throughout various authorities. 
Second, disclosure can alert agencies and litigants that the hearing 
officer lacks important protections and suffers an “impartiality gap,” i.e., 
a gap between existing and model impartiality protections. By 
identifying impartiality gaps, disclosure can help nudge agencies across 
the federal government to think more about their programs and turn to 
substantive recommendations.42 Third, the proposed disclosure form’s 
identified criteria help Congress oversee how agencies across the 
administrative state use their delegated discretion. Fourth, disclosure can 
provide interest groups a means to focus agency and congressional 
                                                     
41. See infra Part II. 
42. See infra note 274. 
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attention on so-called informal adjudication. Finally, disclosure has the 
virtue of recognizing litigants’ dignitary interests by helping them 
understand the process to which they are subject. 
Of course, disclosure is often a second-best regulatory response—and 
perhaps a cynical one that seeks only to calm political impulses to 
ineffectively address underlying substantive problems.43 Congress could 
more directly regulate hearing officers’ protections (and likely should).44 
Yet, it has refrained from doing so, perhaps because of ideological 
preferences, concerns over hindering agency flexibility, its inability to 
find agreement as to details, apathy, or the lack of information on non-
ALJs’ current status. The proposed disclosures, however, are at the very 
least a useful start in providing interested parties and Congress more 
data to assess whether broader and more uniform changes to non-ALJs’ 
impartiality protections are necessary or appropriate. As in the consumer 
space, disclosure likely provides the most workable way of protecting 
impartiality. 
I. TOWARD OPTIMAL IMPARTIALITY PROTECTIONS 
Optimal process is a means of reducing decisionmaking errors. 
Because due process only guarantees minimal process for certain kinds 
of bureaucratic decisionmaking, optimal process for agencies requires 
congressional codification or congressional delegation to agencies for 
promulgation. This Part considers optimal impartiality protections for 
                                                     
43. See Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 
127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1596–97 (2014) (arguing that “choice-limiting” forms of regulations may 
often prove optimal, but behavioral law and economics’ choice-enhancing regulation will further 
political consensus); Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 34 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1090, 1093 (2007) (noting that disclosure can function as “regulation-
lite” to appease those who would “ordinarily oppose regulation”); William C. Whitford, The 
Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer Transactions, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 400, 436 (1973). 
44. I am skeptical that non-ALJ impartiality protections, unlike hearing procedures, should be 
tailored to specific non-ALJs or programs; instead, impartiality concerns are very likely the same in 
all contexts. After all, the Court has not engaged in Mathews balancing for impartiality as it has for 
other procedures. Accordingly, I am inclined to support statutory impartiality protections for all or, 
at least, most non-ALJ hearings. But because agencies and scholars often worry that useful 
differences across agencies and regulatory programs belie uniform treatment, see, for example, 
Emily S. Bremer, Designing the Decider, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 67, 81 (2017) (“The 
principal—and most frequently invoked—benefit of agency procedural discretion is that it enables 
an agency to design its processes in a manner best suited to meet the unique needs of that agency 
and the regulatory program at issue.”). I am taking a more conservative approach here by seeking to 
increase data on non-ALJs (and allowing agencies to explain when they choose not to impose 
certain impartiality protections) before considering the suitability of uniform provisions. 
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non-ALJs and helps identify the benefits of a model impartiality 
disclosure in Section III.A. 
A. Nature and Purpose of Optimal Protections for Impartiality 
Optimal decisionmaking is not perfect decisionmaking. It is, instead, 
a process that seeks to achieve net benefits “up until the point at 
which . . . marginal benefits and costs are . . . roughly equal as far as we 
can tell.”45 Evaluating optimal (or even minimally required) process is 
famously and necessarily context-specific46 and requires the designer to 
identify the benefits sought (such as legitimacy, transparency, dignitary 
acknowledgment, or correct outcomes) and the costs incurred (such as 
pecuniary expense, diversion of resources from more meaningful 
problems, or bureaucratic lethargy).47 Despite the economic patina of 
cost-benefit optimal process, optimal process is as much art and 
educated intuition as science.48 
One of the main goals of optimal process is, or should be, to temper 
improper motivations. Public-choice theory views administrative 
decisionmaking as a contested settlement between various interest 
groups,49 including agency officials, regulated parties, putative 
regulatory beneficiaries, and congressional and presidential principals. 
Each group has its own interests that it seeks to advance despite their 
potential inconsistency with the public welfare or governing legal 
standards. By permitting the airing of evidence, allowing the challenging 
of evidence, and requiring reasoned decisionmaking, procedure can 
neutralize improper self-interested motivations of agency officials in 
particular. 
                                                     
45. Adrian Vermeule, Optimal Abuse of Power, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 673, 693 (2015). 
46. Friendly, supra note 16, at 1270 (stating that Professor Kenneth Culp Davis “was 
undoubtedly right when he observed in 1970, ‘[t]he best answer to the overall question of whether 
we want more judicialization or less is probably that we need more in some contexts and less in 
other contexts’” (quoting KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE: 1970 
SUPPLEMENT § 1.04-9, at 34 (1971))). 
47. See id. at 1276, 1303–04. For instance, Friendly wrote that he “would draw a distinction 
between cases in which government is seeking to take action against the citizen from those in which 
it is simply denying a citizen’s request.” Id. at 1295. 
48. See Vermeule, supra note 45, at 693 (discussing JON ELSTER, SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE: 
JURIES, ASSEMBLIES, ELECTIONS 13 (2013)). Indeed, these uncertainties will likely render it 
impossible to determine when process has become optimal, and the competition between different 
values (for example, expertise, accountability, and impartiality) can render the normative goal 
highly debatable. See id. at 677, 693–94. 
49. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal 
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 551 (2002) (describing public-choice theory). 
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Aside from tempering improper motivation, optimal process can also 
mitigate cognitive errors and thereby improve decisionmaking.50 People 
rely on various mental shortcuts (or, in psychological jargon, heuristics) 
and organizing schema to process complex stimuli and information.51 
Both can be useful. Take, for instance, relying on political parties as a 
heuristic to choose between policy options when lacking the time or 
inclination to research. Relatedly, schema can help recognize and 
process familiar stimuli and provide signals, such as that the woman in a 
black robe in the front of a courtroom is the judge. But they can also lead 
to errors.52 Heuristics can lead to incorrect conclusions, such as that 
noteworthy events, like airplane crashes, happen more than they do.53 
And over-reliance on schema based on racial, gender, or socio-economic 
stereotypes can prevent the use of information gathered from actual 
encounters.54 Imposing a process for decisionmaking, such as requiring 
reason giving or limitations on evidence that one may consider, can 
mitigate these errors. 
One key element of optimal process is the presence of an impartial 
decisionmaker. Impartiality can further both goals of optimal process. It 
can significantly limit conscious or unconscious motivated reasoning. 
For instance, a decisionmaker whose job or pay are controlled by one of 
the parties has reason to favor that party. It can also mitigate cognitive 
errors that may arise when the adjudicator has professional or personal 
relationships with a party or a person whose interests the decision may 
significantly affect. 
But process has costs. In the impartiality context, one could advocate 
for all adjudicators to have the same protections as Article III judges—
with offices that last during “good [b]ehaviour” and salaries that do not 
diminish.55 Obviously, however, this kind of protection is very 
financially costly, and it ties Congress’s hands in structuring the 
government. Other protections for adjudicatory independence may 
provide sufficient comfort, such as requiring good cause for removal or 
limiting an employing agency’s ability (as opposed to Congress) to 
reduce or increase the hearing officer’s pay. Relatedly, agency 
adjudicators may present different concerns than judicial officers 
                                                     
50. See id. at 553–54 (“[P]oor decisions are often the result of fallibility rather than culpability.”). 
51. Id. at 555–56. 
52. See id. at 558. 
53. Id. at 556 (discussing the “availability heuristic”). 
54. See SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 132–33 (2d ed. 1991). 
55. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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because they work for agencies that combine executive, quasi-judicial, 
and quasi-legislative functions. 
B. Due Process’s Limitations 
Despite some similarities, due process is minimal—not optimal. Due 
process has a grand provenance and important place within American 
notions of justice.56 But, whether under the Fifth or Fourteenth 
Amendments, its domain is limited in numerous ways, and its 
indeterminate requirements set a procedural floor. This Section briefly 
discusses the limitations and requirements as most relevant to the non-
ALJs in Part II and the proposed disclosure in Part III. 
Due process does not apply to all agency adjudications. It applies only 
to deprivations of “life, liberty, or property.”57 In the administrative 
context, deprivations of property are most germane. Due process applies 
to the government’s efforts to take away an individual’s “legitimate 
claim of entitlement” based on mutual expectations from state law or 
some other source of law outside of the Due Process Clause itself.58 This 
inquiry does not capture certain agency action, such as most 
adjudications that deny applications for benefits59 or that concern the 
refusal to rehire an individual with only a unilateral hope of 
reemployment.60 Once due process applies, it requires fairly little.61 At 
its core, due process mandates only “some kind of hearing”62 before the 
government deprives one of a protected interest. That hearing must 
provide the affected party sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard 
                                                     
56. See Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 
121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1681–1703 (2012). 
57. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
58. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
59. See 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 9.4, at 758–59, 780–83 (5th 
ed. 2010). Pierce notes that the authority that bestows property interests, such as state legislatures or 
Congress, can and have prevented property interests from forming in awarded benefits by expressly 
stating that the benefit at issue does not create an individual entitlement, thereby undermining any 
contrary mutual expectation. See id. at 758–59. 
60. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 578. 
61. See Emily S. Bremer & Sharon B. Jacobs, Agency Innovation in Vermont Yankee’s White 
Space, 32 J. LAND USE 523, 531–32 (2017) (describing due process’s minimal role in agency-
designed procedures). 
62. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 570 n.7. 
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before an impartial decisionmaker.63 The decisionmaker must provide a 
brief statement of reasons for the decision.64 
As to the impartiality requirement, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
directed courts to look for either actual bias or risk of bias. The former is 
extremely rare because judges often are not aware of their own biases 
and the direct proof or strong inferential evidence of a judge’s 
predisposition against a party is extremely difficult to establish.65 
Accordingly, almost all impartiality claims concern the unconstitutional 
risk of bias. In that context, courts consider whether the decisionmaker 
has a financial interest in the decision (either personally66 or for a 
program that the decisionmaker administers67); institutional loyalty, 
psychological pressure, or compulsion;68 a party’s influence in the 
decisionmaker’s selection;69 and other relationships between the 
decisionmaker and the litigating parties.70 Yet even with these factors, 
courts have generally been forgiving in the administrative context.71 
Some, in fact, have criticized the Court’s case law on impartiality in the 
administrative state as “poorly reasoned . . . [and] feebly attempting to 
distinguish between the due process limits imposed on judicial and 
administrative adjudication.”72 
                                                     
63. Friendly, supra note 16, at 1279–91. 
64. Id.; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (noting that “[t]he fundamental 
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner’” (citation omitted)). 
65. See Dmitry Bam, Making Appearances Matter: Recusal and the Appearance of Bias, 2011 
BYU L. REV. 943, 967. 
66. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 520, 535 (1927). 
67. See Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60–62 (1972). 
68. See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 196 n.10 (1982). The Court has suggested in the 
separation of powers context that an official’s ability to remove a subordinate official at-will may 
implicate impartiality. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 
493, 507 n.10 (2010). 
69. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884–86 (2009). 
70. For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court suggested that the relationship between a judge and a 
former law associate or partner could be problematic. See McClure, 456 U.S. at 197 n.11. 
71. See, e.g., id. at 196–97 (holding that hearing officers employed by insurance carriers were not 
partial because the government paid their salaries and ultimately the claims at issue); Marcello v. 
Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 311 (1955) (holding that the decisionmaker’s reporting to officials in the 
agency with investigative or prosecutorial functions did not present impartiality concerns “when 
considered against the long-standing practice in deportation proceedings, judicial approved in 
numerous decision in the federal courts, and against the special considerations applicable to 
deportation which the Congress may take into account in exercising its particularly broad discretion 
in immigration matters”).  
72. Martin H. Redish & Kristin McCall, Due Process, Free Expression, and the Administrative 
State, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 297, 299 (2018). 
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Even assuming the Court would apply due process’s impartiality 
norms with gusto in the administrative context, due process would have 
little bearing on the perceived failings in the introductory examples. 
High SEC-win rates in agency hearings over a few years, by themselves, 
do not indicate that the decisionmakers are biased or suggest why they 
might have a risk of bias. The internal pressure on a former SEC ALJ is 
more troubling, but given her statutory protections from the agency’s 
retaliation,73 the pressure is unlikely to be sufficient to raise due 
process’s hackles. For immigration judges, due process likely has 
nothing to say about political hiring by itself; the Appointments Clause 
permits political consideration in hiring officers,74 employees,75 and even 
Article III judges.76 The fact that the Department of Justice is not a party 
in the immigration-removal litigation (the Department of Homeland 
Security is) further mitigates concerns over the appointment alone.77 
And the PTAB rehearings, although unorthodox, are not obviously of 
constitutional concern. As a matter of black-letter law, agency heads can 
reverse adjudicator decisions without deferring at all to the initial 
decision.78 The fact that PTAB permits the same end through a clunky 
process does not change the fact that an agency superior retains 
decisionmaking authority. 
C. Devising Optimal Process 
The Due Process Clause, accordingly, leaves optimal process to 
policymakers. Whether public or private, these policymakers—
Congress, agencies, or private organizations—must consider various 
values at stake, balance them against their costs, and consider how 
comprehensive procedural schemes should be. As relevant to agency 
adjudication, Congress has attempted to do so for so-called formal 
adjudication, but it has largely delegated the duty to agencies for 
informal adjudication. 
                                                     
73. These statutory protections are discussed in detail infra at Section I.C.1.  
74. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
75. See Lucia v. SEC, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018) (citing United States v. 
Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1879)) (noting that Appointments Clause does not apply to 
employees). 
76. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
77. See KENT BARNETT ET AL., NON-ALJ ADJUDICATORS IN FEDERAL AGENCIES: STATUS, 
SELECTION, OVERSIGHT, AND REMOVAL 46 n.137 (2018). 
78. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2018). 
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1. Procedural Code 
A single code that governs all agency proceedings is beneficial 
because it simplifies design choices across the bureaucracy for common 
procedural matters, aids individuals in interacting with different agencies 
across the bureaucracy, and—if well designed—elevates the overall 
quality of agency process by displacing lesser agency procedures. But 
comprehensive statutes can be counterproductive if they reach matters 
that are too diverse to ensure that the procedures’ benefits overcome 
their costs.79 Thus, comprehensive procedure may work for only certain 
kinds of decisionmaking, and policymakers must consider when 
additional categorization is necessary or when additional process must 
be unique to a particular agency’s action. 
The APA is an attempt to provide government-wide process for three 
of four forms of agency decisionmaking.80 The APA divides all 
administrative action into not just adjudication and rulemaking, but a so-
called formal and informal version of each kind of action. Only one of 
the four forms of agency decisionmaking—informal adjudication—lacks 
significant statutory requirements. 
For formal adjudication that an agency must make “on the record,”81 
the APA generally requires an ALJ to preside over what is usually a 
trial-like evidentiary hearing.82 Parties are usually entitled to receive 
notice of hearing and grounds for the asserted issues,83 present oral or 
written evidence, cross-examine witnesses,84 propose findings of fact 
                                                     
79. See Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 
297, 305 (1986). 
80. See Vermeule, supra note 45, at 682 (stating that it is “unlikely that the [APA’s] compromise 
[over separation-of-functions for certain kinds of adjudication] is optimal in any strong sense, but 
historically it was designed to protect multiple values, each to some degree but none fully, and in 
that weaker sense has an optimizing character”). Aside from these transubstantial procedural 
requirements, Congress often provides additional or different procedural requirements for particular 
agency decisionmaking. See, e.g., 1 PIERCE, supra note 59, § 7.7 (discussing hybrid rulemaking that 
requires more than informal rulemaking but less than formal rulemaking). These hybrid 
requirements can further optimal procedure. See Friendly, supra note 16, at 1268. 
81. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a). 
82. Id. The APA probably allows inquisitorial hearings in which the ALJ helps develop the 
record. The Social Security Administration uses inquisitorial hearings, which are governed by a 
separate statute that served as the basis for the APA’s formal-adjudication provisions. See Paul R. 
Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 679, 704 
n.103 (2002); Jeffrey Scott Wolfe, Are You Willing to Make the Commitment in Writing? The APA, 
ALJs, and SSA, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 203, 209 (2002). 
83. 5 U.S.C. § 554(b). The APA has a specific notice provision for notice when the agency seeks 
to revoke or suspend a granted license. Id. § 558(c)(1). 
84. Id. § 556(d). 
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and conclusions of law,85 and obtain a decision from the agency based 
on the exclusive hearing record.86 
Of formal proceedings’ characteristics, perhaps the most significant is 
the use of ALJs. Unlike almost all other federal administrative 
adjudicators, ALJs’ oversight and removal are governed by statute and 
OPM regulations. They are prohibited from engaging in prosecutorial or 
investigative duties or reporting to an agency official who does.87 They 
are generally prohibited from having ex parte communications with 
agency officials, parties, or others about a fact in issue.88 ALJs are 
exempt from civil-service performance reviews, and they cannot receive 
bonuses from their agencies.89 Agencies can discipline or remove ALJs 
only for “good cause” as determined by the Merit Systems Protection 
Board (MSPB), another independent agency, after an on-the-record 
hearing.90 
In crafting these protections for ALJs, the drafters of the APA 
intended to address the most pressing criticisms concerning the 
appearance of partiality in agency adjudications,91 and they expected 
ALJs to oversee nearly all statutorily required hearings.92 
Notably, ALJs’ relationship with their agencies has recently changed. 
Congress delegated authority over the ALJ-hiring process to OPM when 
it created ALJs,93 and OPM’s method of hiring, with some adjustments, 
had been in place since immediately after the APA’s enactment.94 Under 
                                                     
85. Id. § 557(c). 
86. Id. § 557(b) (initial and recommended decisions); § 556(e) (requiring exclusive record). The 
same goes for on-the-record rulemaking. § 553(b) (requiring notice of the rulemaking hearings); 
§ 556(a) (establishing that its requirements apply to formal adjudication and rulemaking), except 
that the ALJ need only create a record and not issue a decision, id. § 557(b) (not requiring initial or 
recommended decisions in rulemakings). 
87. See id. § 554(d)(2). 
88. See id. § 554(d)(1). 
89. See Barnett, supra note 33, at 1655–56. 
90. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a). 
91. See Gifford, supra note 26, at 3–9, 43–45. 
92. S. REP. NO. 752, at 207 (1946), reprinted in COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 32 
(arguing that formal adjudication applied to nearly all hearings required by statute). 
93. See 5 U.S.C. § 1305 (delegating authority for OPM to enact regulations, among other things, 
for ALJ hiring under 5 U.S.C. § 3105). 
94. See Paul R. Verkuil et al., The Federal Administrative Judiciary, in 2 ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 771, 931 (1992) 
(“[T]hen-professor Antonin Scalia [noted] ‘it was evidently contemplated that the Civil Service 
Commission [OPM’s predecessor agency] would establish qualifying requirements by general rule, 
and that the agencies would then select from among all individuals who met those requirements.’”). 
Since it issued its first regulations in 1947, immediately after the APA’s enactment, OPM’s 
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the old system, ALJs were hired via a merit-based system—with a 
written exam, interviews, and rankings—led by OPM for decades.95 
After ranking the candidates, OPM would send the appointing agency 
the top three scoring candidates.96 OPM’s process had long been 
criticized for its scoring formula, its refusal to consider subject-matter 
expertise, and its slow or limited hiring process.97 These criticisms 
suggest that OPM hiring was not operating optimally, even if it did 
provide some useful separation between the agency and hiring decisions. 
The hiring process recently changed when OPM, despite its status as 
an independent agency98 with statutory authority over the ALJ-hiring 
process,99 agreed to follow President Trump’s July 2018 Executive 
Order on ALJ hiring.100 That order, in short, called for removing OPM 
from the hiring process, permitting agencies to hire ALJs directly, and 
allowing agencies (with one minor limitation) to set hiring 
qualifications.101 The key changes are that ALJs are no longer hired 
under a competitive process and that no intermediary screens applicants. 
Whether by design or by accident, the new appointment method 
addresses some of the concerns over the OPM process by giving 
agencies nearly complete control over the process. Yet, instead of 
addressing specific concerns (such as those concerning the scoring 
formula or speed), it simply cut the intermediary and merit selection out 
of the process altogether. In contrast to the OPM procedure that was 
inefficient, the Executive Order may be too efficient.102 The area of ALJ 
                                                     
predecessor used a merit ranking system and limited agencies’ ability to select new ALJs from only 
the top three candidates. See id. 
95. See Verkuil et al., supra note 94, at 830–35 (discussing original manners of ALJ hiring by 
OPM’s predecessor agency, the Civil Service Commission). See generally BURROWS, supra note 29 
(outlining ALJ-hiring process as of 2010). 
96. See BURROWS, supra note 29, at 2–3; infra note 154 (discussing problems with the ALJ-
hiring process). 
97. See Verkuil et al., supra note 94, at 954–55; BURROWS, supra note 29, at 3–6. 
98. 5 U.S.C. § 1101 (“The Office of Personnel Management is an independent establishment in 
the executive branch.”). Notably, however, the Director of OPM does not appear to have protection 
from at-will removal. See id. § 1102(a) (addressing only appointment, not removal). 
99. See supra note 93. 
100. See generally Office of Personnel Management, Memorandum re: Executive Order—
Excepting Administrative Law Judges from the Competitive Service (July 10, 2018), 
https://chcoc.gov/content/executive-order—excepting-administrative-law-judges-competitive-
service [https://perma.cc/97FF-SBW4] [hereinafter OPM Memo]. 
101. See Exec. Order, supra note 30; OPM Memo, supra note 100. The one requirement that 
ALJs must have is a law license. See Exec. Order, supra 30, § 3(a)(ii), at 32756. 
102. For a more thorough discussion of the recent changes to ALJ hiring, see Kent Barnett, 
Raiding the OPM Den: The New Method of ALJ Hiring, 36 YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT 
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hiring, accordingly, is a developing area that is still looking for optimal 
design. 
Regardless of the optimal nature of the ALJs’ former or current hiring 
process, the APA’s impartiality provisions for ALJs and its specific 
consideration of ALJ hiring are especially good candidates for optimal 
process because they track due process variables related to impartiality 
and provide concrete protections in the administrative context that have 
proven workable over decades. First, for instance, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has demonstrated its concern over a party’s role—such as, 
perhaps, an agency’s—in appointing an adjudicator.103 Second, the APA 
includes prohibitions on an agency reviewing or giving bonuses to 
adjudicators.104 The Court has recognized that the power of a party or 
case outcome to affect the pay an agency official receives affects that 
official’s independence.105 Third, the APA prohibits the agency from 
removing ALJs without cause,106 and the Court has noted repeatedly that 
superiors’ at-will removal permits them to have subordinate officials do 
their bidding.107 Fourth, and related to removal, the APA requires a 
separation of functions, for which ALJs cannot investigate or prosecute 
or report to an agency official who does.108 Although the Court has 
indicated that combined functions generally cause no constitutional 
concern,109 the separation of functions was a significant addition to the 
APA to address concerns over pro-agency adjudicators who would 
                                                     
(July 11, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/raiding-the-opm-den-the-new-method-of-alj-hiring-by-kent-
barnett/ [https://perma.cc/GUY5-JBKZ]. 
103. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884–86 (2009) (holding that a party’s 
substantial and disproportionate participation in donating to and supporting judicial candidate 
required the elected justice’s recusal). 
104. See Barnett, supra note 33, at 1655–56. 
105. See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 197 (1982) (noting that hiring entity had no 
interest in the case outcome); Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60–62 (1972) (holding that due 
process did not permit adjudicator to decide matters whose outcome affected a budget for which he 
was responsible); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 520–22, 535 (1927) (holding that due process did 
not permit adjudicator to adjudicate matters whose outcome affected his pay). 
106. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2018). 
107. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 493 (2010) 
(“[O]ne who holds his office only during the pleasure of another, cannot be depended upon to 
maintain an attitude of independence against the latter’s will.” (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935))). 
108. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2). 
109. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 58 (1975) (“That the combination of investigative and 
adjudicative functions does not, without more, constitute a due process violation, does not, of 
course, preclude a court from determining from the special facts and circumstances present in the 
case before it that the risk of unfairness is intolerably high.”). 
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manipulate factual findings to reach the agency’s policy objectives.110 
Finally, the APA limits ALJs’ ex parte communications with those 
inside (to some extent) and outside of the agency.111 The D.C. Circuit 
has indicated that ex parte communications as part of adjudication can 
present due process concerns.112 
2. Delegation of Authority to Craft Procedure 
Outside of the APA’s requirements, such as with “informal 
adjudication,” Congress has largely delegated the creation of optimal 
process to agencies by giving them the authority to provide process 
beyond the APA’s requirements.113 The U.S. Supreme Court has 
recognized that courts have an extremely limited place in requiring 
agencies to provide process beyond any statutory requirement.114 
Agencies have the substantive expertise, and thus the institutional 
advantage, in determining which processes are worth the costs.115 States 
often provide state agencies similar or even greater flexibility.116 
Moreover, due to doctrinal changes in recent decades, agencies have 
gained more delegated space. The APA drafters in 1946 thought that the 
APA provisions for formal adjudication would apply to nearly all 
evidentiary or adversarial hearings.117 Yet, agencies obtained 
significantly more discretion to choose whether to use ALJs or non-ALJs 
after the Court’s well-known 1984 decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
NRDC, Inc.118 That decision permits agencies to resolve ambiguous 
                                                     
110. See Gifford, supra note 26, at 6–8. 
111. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d), 557(d)(1). 
112. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also U.S. Lines, Inc. v. Fed. 
Maritime Comm’n, 584 F.2d 519, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“The inconsistency of secret ex parte 
contacts with the notion of a fair hearing and with the principles of fairness implicit in due process 
has long been recognized.”); Appeal of Pub. Serv. Co., 454 A.2d 435, 441–43 (N.H. 1982) (holding 
that even in the absence of procedures by the legislature, due process requires commission members 
to refrain from ex parte communications when they act in an adjudicative capacity). 
113. 5 U.S.C. § 559.  
114. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 523 (1978) (stating that “such 
circumstances [i.e., when courts may appropriately require agencies to impose procedures beyond 
statutory requirements], if they exist, are extremely rare”). 
115. See Adrian Vermeule, Deference and Due Process, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1895, 1920–
21 (2016). 
116. See Bonfield, supra note 79, at 313 (discussing how the 1981 Model State Administrative 
Procedure Act permits agencies to grant additional procedural rights, as long as other parties are not 
substantially prejudiced, and to use a mix of rulemaking and adjudication as part of the same 
decisionmaking proceeding).  
117. See supra notes 91–92. 
118. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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language in statutes that they administer,119 including whether the statute 
requires “on the record” hearings.120 With this discretion in hand, 
agencies have turned to non-ALJ adjudication en masse.121 
As agencies go about fashioning adjudication and adjudicators, 
systems design—including adjudicatory or rulemaking procedure and 
impartiality protections—can promote or hinder over-enforcement.122 
Sometimes bureaucracies have incentives to provide more process than 
due process or the APA requires. For example, process can further 
agency missions by promoting accurate decisionmaking, which achieves 
objectives in a more efficient manner than an error-ridden process.123 
Agencies may also permit additional process to satisfy particular 
stakeholders.124 For example, the SEC recently provided regulated 
parties significantly more discovery rights in formal adjudication than 
the APA requires after regulated parties in enforcement proceedings 
expressed significant fairness concerns.125 Agencies, too, may adopt 
additional procedures to render administrative and judicial review more 
efficient.126 
But agencies, as agents of Congress and the President, may have an 
interest in achieving certain policy goals to please those who comprise 
the agency, their different overseers (the President, the current Congress, 
and congressional committees), or interest groups. Agencies may view 
their missions as tilting towards certain outcomes to please any or all of 
these groups, despite contrary statutory design or fairness concerns. 
                                                     
119. See id. at 842–43. 
120. See Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC v. Johnson, 443 F.3d 12, 13–14, 17–18 (1st Cir. 
2006) (recognizing that Chevron requires courts, contrary to earlier practice, to defer to agencies’ 
reasonable interpretation of their statutes as to whether hearings must be “on the record”). The 
Ninth Circuit is the only circuit that retains a presumption in favor of formal adjudication when the 
statute requires a hearing. See JOHN M. ROGERS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 122 (3d ed. 2012). 
121. See Barnett, supra note 33, at 1662–66. 
122. See Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1129, 
1143–50 (2016) (considering how systems design affects over- or under-enforcement, especially in 
context of criminal and immigration enforcement, and how the APA has attempted to address some 
of these issues by using impartial ALJs). 
123. See Vermeule, supra note 115, at 1905. 
124. See id. at 1925. 
125. Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes to Amend Rules Governing Administrative Proceedings 
(Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-209.html [https://perma.cc/CNA3-
L3AM]. The final rule is available at SEC, AMENDMENTS TO THE COMMISSION’S RULES OF PRACTICE 
(2016), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2016/34-78319.pdf [https://perma.cc/798S-TUR7]. 
126. See Vermeule, supra note 115, at 1905. Notably, if an agency has not assembled an 
administrative record or explained its decision before judicial review, courts can require agencies to 
assemble an administrative record and compel agency officials to testify concerning their decisions. 
See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971). 
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Take two examples, including one in the introduction. The Trump 
Administration has made it clear that it wants to limit legal and illegal 
immigration, including asylum claims. Former Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions first did so by issuing a decision that limited the grounds upon 
which an asylum applicant could obtain relief.127 He then went further in 
seeking to alter how immigration judges are evaluated—by assessing 
their case-processing speed and their reversal rates by the department or 
federal courts.128 Negative evaluations could lead to discipline or 
removal.129 As another example, the Obama Administration’s 
Department of Education issued a controversial “Dear Colleague” letter 
to schools that receive federal funding that called for certain procedural 
requirements in sexual-harassment or sexual-assault hearings.130 Some 
questioned whether the agency was designing a system for over-
enforcement of certain statutory mandates at the expense of accused 
individuals’ due process rights.131 
Because agencies’ preferences may diverge from those of the 
Congress that enacted the regulatory framework and because agencies 
can use systems design to further their preferences, procedural 
delegation presents a classic case of Congress incurring principal-agency 
costs in needing to oversee a potentially disloyal or errant agent.132 
Agency procedures, given their number and oblique effect on 
substantive outcomes, often lack salience, rendering oversight difficult-
to-impossible. And agencies’ use of internal guidance and even custom 
to establish procedural norms can impede transparency for even the 
vigilant overseer. In short, Congress must have accessible information to 
monitor agencies. 
Even absent preference divergence, agencies may have 
epistemological problems in designing optimal procedure. Depending on 
                                                     
127. See Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018) (limiting grounds upon which victims of 
private criminal activity can seek asylum). 
128. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
129. See id. 
130. See Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Dep’t of Educ. (Apr. 4, 2011), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9CB-EV77]. 
131. See, e.g., Matthew R. Triplett, Note, Sexual Assault on College Campuses: Seeking the 
Appropriate Balance Between Due Process and Victim Protection, 62 DUKE L.J. 487, 489 n.9 
(2012) (collecting sources). Perhaps some procedure, such as ample reason-giving requirements, 
can reveal faulty agency motivations or decisionmaking, but it is hardly a panacea. See Vermeule, 
supra note 115, at 1928. After all, reason giving can only do so much when, as with many 
immigration and sexual-assault hearings, the decision maker’s findings on credibility are often 
determinative and difficult to review. 
132. See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 18 
(1982). 
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the frequency of agencies’ use of adjudication and their officials’ 
familiarity with designing procedure, agency officials may have little 
expertise in designing process, even if they are experts in the underlying 
substantive area. Indeed, their substantive expertise may lead them to 
conclude, incorrectly, that they are also procedural experts.133 The same 
problems with procedure’s salience and transparency that hobbles 
congressional oversight also inhibits agencies, whether creating or 
improving procedural design, from easily learning about other agencies’ 
procedural schema. Likewise, the hidden nature of procedural schema 
renders it more difficult for outside groups—whether affected interest 
groups, academics, or good-government watchdogs—to identify 
problems and propose improvements. 
II. IMPARTIALITY PROTECTIONS FOR NON-ALJS 
Outside of the APA’s relatively generous process for on-the-record 
adjudications, agency adjudication is varied and, because of its 
seemingly endless variety, easy to ignore. This Part seeks to focus 
attention on non-ALJs’ impartiality. The empirical data presented here 
confirm that agencies have provided neither uniform nor optimal 
impartiality protections, as measured by ALJs’ protections, to non-ALJs. 
A. Optimal Impartiality for Non-ALJ Hearings 
As indicated in Section I.A, identifying optimal process is frequently 
difficult because of problems measuring the costs and benefits of process 
and because of the necessity in recalibrating process over time. But the 
APA provides a useful guide for optimal impartiality protections 
because its provisions track many due process considerations in the 
administrative adjudicatory context.134 
These provisions are optimal beyond ALJ proceedings. As noted 
earlier, the APA drafters thought that the APA provisions for formal 
adjudication would apply to most all evidentiary or adversarial hearings, 
but case law has given agencies more discretion in fashioning their 
                                                     
133. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 49, at 560 (“[E]xperts may myopically focus on issues 
within their area of expertise and thereby fail to recognize that a decision would benefit from 
accessing other bodies of knowledge or ways of thinking.”). 
134. The APA also provides guidance on optimal process concerning the hearings themselves, 
which agencies have largely incorporated into many “informal” adjudications. I focus here on the 
APA impartiality protections, which agencies have treated much more divergently. See infra note 
139 and accompanying text. 
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hearings.135 As I have argued elsewhere, agencies have chosen non-ALJs 
largely to have more control over them and their hiring.136 But, notably, 
the growing adoption of non-ALJs does not indicate that the APA’s 
impartiality protections for ALJs are suboptimal or that Congress 
intended to deviate from the APA model. ACUS (in consultation with 
working groups comprised of agency officials and outside 
administrative-law lawyers) has applied many of them in its Model 
Adjudication Rules, which are intended to apply to both formal and 
informal agency hearings.137 And ACUS has suggested best practices for 
a large subset of non-ALJ hearings that largely mirror practices in ALJ 
hearings.138 Accordingly, even if these impartiality factors need some 
tweaking, they provide a useful, well-known, and oft-used guide for 
assessing non-ALJ hearings. 
B. Empirical Data on Non-ALJ Hearings and Impartiality 
The findings discussed in this Section are limited to data regarding 
informal adjudications that permit oral evidentiary hearings. The process 
during the hearings (pleadings, burdens of proof, discovery, cross-
examination, reasoned decision) has come to resemble formal 
adjudication.139 The important difference between these kinds of 
proceedings is the presiding official. In the hearings that are the subject 
of this study, non-ALJ adjudicators preside. 
To gather more data on non-ALJ proceedings and especially non-ALJ 
impartiality, the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal 
System and I recently administered a government-wide survey to 
agencies as academic consultants for ACUS, the independent federal 
                                                     
135. See supra notes 117–120 and accompanying text. 
136. See Barnett, supra note 33, at 1667–71. The Social Security Administration had expressed 
its displeasure at OPM’s hiring process and refusal to engage in ALJ hiring more frequently. See 
generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-14, RESULTS ORIENTED CULTURES: 
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SHOULD REVIEW ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE PROGRAM 
TO IMPROVE HIRING AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT (2010). 
137. See MODEL ADJUDICATION RULE 100(A) (ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S. 2018) (defining 
“adjudication” to include hearings over which ALJs and others preside). The MARs do not address 
appointment, which would require congressional action if all adjudicators were selected like ALJs 
under the auspices of OPM. 
138. See ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 2016-4: EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS NOT 
REQUIRED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, 2–9 (2016) (recommending practices 
concerning adjudicator impartiality and hearing process for “Type B” adjudicatory hearings, which 
are those required hearings to which the APA does not apply, over which ALJs do not preside, and 
which must have an exclusive record). 
139. See Barnett, supra note 33, at 1698–99. A 1992 ACUS report noted that informal hearings 
“contain most of the ingredients of an APA formal hearing.” Verkuil et al., supra note 94, at 1053–54. 
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agency charged with providing research and recommendations on 
improving the federal administrative state.140 With ACUS’s unparalleled 
access to federal agencies, we were able to report findings on the current 
state of the impartiality protections that agencies have provided non-
ALJs (or the lack thereof). These findings served as the basis of our 
report to ACUS, which ACUS has transmitted to federal agencies. That 
report provided our full findings and guidance on how agencies should 
fashion impartiality protections. This Part, relying on the report and 
recommendations to ACUS, summarizes our research design and the 
portion of our findings that are germane to my disclosure proposal in 
Part III. 
Because of the variety of agency adjudications, it is frequently 
difficult to identify and define various terms related to non-ALJ 
hearings. Moreover, including complicated, nuanced definitions could 
have dissuaded agencies from completing the survey. Thus, we provided 
as descriptive a definition as we thought prudent to capture the kinds of 
non-ALJ hearings that we sought to consider (referred to as “oral 
hearings” in the survey itself and as “non-ALJ hearings” in this Article): 
One of the parties to the adjudication can—by statute, 
regulation, or other law—obtain an oral hearing over which an 
agency official presides to present evidence, even if most 
matters are handled through written submissions without an oral 
hearing, and the presiding agency official is not a member or 
commissioner of the agency, and is not an “Administrative Law 
Judge.” Instead, the agency official goes by another title, such as 
Administrative Judge, Administrative Appeals Judge, 
Administrative Patent Judge, Board of Contract Appeals Judge, 
Veterans Law Judge, Immigration Judge, Presiding Officer, 
Hearing Officer, etc. The relevant “oral hearings” do not include 
“public hearings” in which members of the public are invited to 
make statements or an initial “front-line” agency decision when 
that initial decision is followed by an evidentiary hearing before 
an agency or court.141 
We sent a detailed survey to 64 federal departments, agencies, or 
subcomponents within them.142 We received 61 responses from 53 
                                                     
140. See generally BARNETT ET AL., supra note 77. 
141. See id. at 13. Notably, initial decisions from an agency that include the right to an oral 
hearing would not qualify under our definition as “front-line” determinations. 
142. See id. at app. A. For comparison’s sake, Raymond Limon (head of the now-defunct OPM 
Office of ALJs) surveyed 80 agencies in 2002, and former ALJ John Frye surveyed 48 agencies in 
1992. Compare RAYMOND LIMON, OFFICE OF ADMIN. LAW JUDGES, THE FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY: THEN AND NOW—A DECADE OF CHANGE 1992–2002, at 2 (2002) 
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entities, whether identified as an “agency” or at least one subcomponent 
within a larger entity.143 One agency, accordingly, may have had more 
than one subcomponent respond. Based on replies from 53 of the 64 
federal entities to which we sent surveys, we had a response rate of 
82.8%.144 While 31 agencies or their subcomponents reported that they 
do not conduct non-ALJ hearings, the analyses that follow are based on 
responses (which we did not independently confirm) from 30 agencies or 
their subcomponents that conduct non-ALJ hearings.145 For ease of 
reference, I shall refer to all responding entities as “agencies.” 
Agencies reported having 47 different kinds of non-ALJ hearings, 15 
of which may consist of only appellate non-ALJ hearings. These 47 
types fell into the following categories (with some kinds of hearings 
fitting into more than one category): government benefits (11), 
enforcement (10), disputes between private parties (9), federal 
employment disputes (6), miscellaneous/other (6), licensing (5), 
government contracts (4), and disputes between different governmental 
agencies (0). No category commanded even 25% of the reported hearing 
                                                     
(“[W]e eventually contacted over 80 Federal agencies and offices . . . .”), with John H. Frye III, 
Survey of Non-ALJ Hearing Programs in the Federal Government, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 261, app. A 
(1992) (listing agencies to which surveys were sent). Depending on how one counts, there are 
approximately 110 federal agencies. See ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., SOURCEBOOK OF THE UNITED 
STATES EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, app. A-1 (2012) (listing agencies). But many of those are highly 
unlikely to have relevant hearings because of their narrow missions. With guidance from ACUS, the 
entity that has created the most comprehensive listing of agencies, we created a list of all agencies 
that, in our judgment, we thought were likely to have relevant hearings. 
143. See BARNETT ET AL., supra note 77, app. B (listing which agencies did and did not respond 
to our surveys and listing whether a responding agency reported having “non-ALJ hearings”). 65 
agencies responded to the Limon Study and 47 responded to the Frye Study. Compare LIMON, 
supra note 142, app. C, with Frye, supra note 142, app. A. 
144. The agencies that did not respond include the Board for Correction for Military Records (for 
the Air Force), Board of Correction of Military Records (for the Army), the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals, the Office of Hearings and Appeals and the 
Legal Services Office for Civilian Health within the Department of Defense, the Food and Drug 
Administration within the Department of Health and Human Sciences, Citizenship-Immigration 
Services within the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Administration Agency, the 
Office of Hearings and Appeals within the Department of Interior, the Federal Housing 
Administration within the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Board of 
Immigration Appeals within the Department of Justice, the Department of the Navy, the Department 
of Transportation, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the National Endowment for the Arts, the 
National Science Foundation, the SEC, and the Small Business Administration. See BARNETT ET 
AL., supra note 77, app. B. 
145. See id. at app. B (listing agencies that responded to our survey and listing the responding 
agencies that reported providing “non-ALJ hearings”); id. at app. C (listing the reported kinds of 
non-ALJ hearings and types of non-ALJs). 
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Types of Non-ALJ Hearings (n=47) 
 
 
Aside from reporting kinds of hearings, agencies also reported 
different types of non-ALJs. Non-ALJs significantly outnumber ALJs. 
The federal government has 1,931 ALJs147 and, as Table 1 indicates, at 
least 10,831 non-ALJ presiding officials, meaning that there are 
approximately five times as many non-ALJs as ALJs. Only 39 of the 
10,831 non-ALJs are part-time agency employees. 
 
                                                     
146. Unlike earlier studies, we did not collect responses concerning the caseloads for different 
non-ALJ hearings because our study focuses more on the non-ALJs themselves and because of what 
we perceived as the difficulty in obtaining reliable data from agencies. See Frye, supra note 142, at 
264 (reporting estimated caseloads and noting lack of consistent agency reporting).  
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Table 1: 
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148. The official who responded for the FMC reported that one non-ALJ is appointed as necessary. 
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Of note, nearly 7,900 of the reported approximately 10,800 non-ALJs 
are patent examiners for PTO.149 To provide more useful reporting of the 
data and to limit the large number of patent examiners from obfuscating 
our findings, I often discuss the data in terms of the number of non-ALJ 
types, as opposed to the total number of non-ALJs. Moreover, one 
should be cautious in placing too much importance on any particular 
non-ALJ type. Some types, despite being able to preside over our 
relevant oral hearings, may only do so occasionally.150 
The more than 10,000 non-ALJs go by numerous titles, including 
Administrative Appeals Judge (and similar variations), Administrative 
Judge, Attorney-Examiner, Copyright Royalty Judge, Hearing Officer, 
Immigration Judge, Judgment Officer, Patent Examiner, Presiding 
Officer, Regional Director, Regional Judicial Officer, and Settlement 
Officer. Of these, 964 have the word “judge” in their titles. 
Most importantly for our research, we sought information from 
agencies about the impartiality of their non-ALJs. In particular, we were 
curious whether agencies gave non-ALJs similar impartiality protections 
that ALJs have by statute. As indicated below, agencies have nothing 
near a uniform approach. 
                                                     
149. As we discussed in our report, PTO expanded their patent-examiner ranks significantly since 
2000. See BARNETT ET AL., supra note 77, at 19–20. 
150. To mitigate the concern that impartiality protections may be impracticable for agency 
officials who rarely preside over hearings, our report recommended that, whenever possible, 
agencies should consolidate hearing-officer duties in as few officials as possible. See id. at 64. 
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1. Hiring Requirements 
Before President Trump’s Executive Order on ALJ hiring, OPM 
required that ALJs meet certain requirements. They must have been 
licensed lawyers with at least seven years litigation or administrative-
law practice.151 They must have participated in hearings at least as 
formal as those over which ALJs preside under the APA.152 Finally, they 
must have passed an examination that considers skills, such as writing 
ability, that are relevant to adjudicatory duties.153 To agencies’ vocalized 
chagrin, OPM did not consider subject-matter expertise.154 Under the 
new process, agencies themselves can set the qualifications for their ALJ 
candidates, save that the candidate must have a law license.155 
As has proven incredibly timely in light of the changes to ALJ hiring, 
we asked agencies about their hiring qualifications for non-ALJs.156 
Agencies reported that 31 of the 37 reported non-ALJ types must meet 
minimum qualifications. We asked about qualifications for (1) outside 
candidates whom agencies consider hiring initially as non-ALJs, and 
(2) agency employees whom agencies move from another position 
within the agency to serve as non-ALJs. Of the 31 non-ALJ types for 
which agencies responded with qualifications information, 23 of those 
types are hired both initially from outside the agency and from within, 
while four are hired only from within and four are hired only from 
outside.157 
                                                     
151. See Qualification Standard for Administrative Law Judge Positions, OPM, 
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/classification-qualifications/general-schedule-qualification-
standards/specialty-areas/administrative-law-judge-positions/ [https://perma.cc/D4FS-8WP7]. 
152. See id. 
153. Id. 
154. See Barnett, supra note 33, at 1704. Despite heavy and longstanding criticism, OPM also 
provided veterans and disabled veterans a significant preference in the scoring of candidates. See 
Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on Our Invisible Judiciary, 33 
ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 115–16 (1981). The preference, as a practical matter, moved veterans to the 
top of the potential candidates list and limits gender diversity. Id. 
155. See Exec. Order, supra note 30, § 3. 
156. We did not ask agencies about the hiring process. After consultation with ACUS staff, we 
concluded that hiring practices are so disparate that attempting to glean useful responses would 
require narrative answers, which would hinder our ability to compare hiring practices. A better 
research model for hiring practices would likely be an interview method. 
157. Agencies did not report any minimum qualifications for six of the non-ALJ types. Most of 
those agencies—such as the Administrative Office of the Courts or the Treasury (for Labor 
Arbitrators), the FDIC, or the Peace Corps—likely did not report any information because of the 
short-term contractual (or temporary and rare) nature of the individual’s adjudication duties. These 
agencies likely do not have formalized requirements. The responding official for the FMC’s two 
types of non-ALJs did not know of any qualifications. 
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Agencies reported hiring agency employees initially for of the 
reported 37 non-ALJ types. We specifically asked agencies about certain 
potential qualifications and asked them to mark all qualifications that 
applied. We asked for them, if applicable, to identify other 
qualifications. As indicated in Figure , they reported the following 
minimum qualifications for initial hires: 
 
Figure 2: 
Minimum Qualifications (Initial Hires) (n=27) 
 
 
Agencies require that nearly two-thirds of the 27 initially-hired non-
ALJ types (63%) have law degrees,158 and some impose related 
requirements, such as expertise in general administrative law (CFTC), 
bar membership (EEOC), a mix of litigation and/or subject-matter 
expertise (EPA and Library of Congress), and dispute-resolution 
experience (NASA). Applicants could meet agencies’ years-of-legal-
practice requirements with between five and ten years of experience. 
Only two other qualifications were common to more than one-third of 
the types: consideration of demeanor and references. Agencies reported 
“other” qualifications, such as scientific degrees (PTO) and certain 
military rank (U.S. Coast Guard). 
Perhaps the most interesting takeaway is that agencies reported only 
considering subject-matter expertise when initially hiring non-ALJs for 
eight non-ALJ types (or 12 types, if including an expansive 
                                                     
158. The NLRB noted that it hires some hearing officers with a law degree and others without. 
17
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understanding of the qualifications with the “other” answers)—not even 
half of the 27 types initially hired. Before the recent changes to ALJ 
hiring, agencies had often lamented OPM’s refusal to consider subject-
matter expertise for ALJs,159 but our findings suggest that agencies 
themselves do not usually consider such expertise. That said, agencies 
consider, without exception, expertise for scientific areas.160 
Agencies reported moving existing employees into non-ALJ roles for, 
coincidentally, 27 non-ALJ types, too (and thus indicating that some 
agencies select non-ALJs from inside and outside of the agency). Similar 
to initial hires, agencies require a law degree for 59% of the non-ALJ 
types hired from within the agency. And agencies that require years of 
legal practice impose from seven to ten years of experience. 
Interestingly, as indicated in Figure , agencies reported more types of 
minimum qualifications for internal hires. With these internal hires, 
agencies were more likely than with outside hires to consider subject-
matter expertise, writing ability, demeanor, and—perhaps most 
surprising—references. Agencies reported similar qualifications under 
“other” as they did for initial hires. 
 
Figure 3: 
Minimum Qualifications (Existing Employees) (n=27) 
 
 
                                                     
159. See Barnett, supra note 33, at 1704. 
160. PTO and NRC reported requiring expertise or scientific degrees.  
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2. Separation of Functions 
To protect ALJs’ independence in proceedings in which the agency is 
often a party, ALJs are prohibited under the APA from performing 
investigative or prosecutorial functions or reporting to one with those 
functions and can only engage in adjudicatory functions.161 
Figure  reports our results. Agencies indicated that 16 (or 43.2%) of 
the 37 non-ALJ types—our largest group—had no required separation of 
functions. Three types worked for agencies that only adjudicate and thus 
have no functions to separate. Three types could perform only 
adjudicative duties and thus had complete separation of functions, like 
ALJs. For the remaining 15 non-ALJ types, 8 were prohibited from 
engaging in investigative or prosecutorial functions, but they could 
engage in other kinds of agency functions. The remaining types reported 
“other” limits. For instance, Treasury’s Settlement Officers cannot 
prosecute or investigate the cases that they decided, Copyright Royalty 
Judges are limited by general ethics and conflicts rules, and Presiding 
Officers for the CFTC cannot report to an employee who prosecutes or 
investigates. 
Figure 4: 
Required Separation of Functions (n=37) 
 
 
The lack of separation of functions may be more troubling in certain 
kinds of hearings, such as those in which the agency is a party and 
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enforcement proceedings, where the agency is particularly interested in 
the outcome of the proceeding. For non-ALJ types that preside over 
hearings in which their agencies are parties, they have no separation of 
functions more than one-third of the time (35.3%). The same percentage 
(35.3%) of those non-ALJ types that preside over hearings in which the 
agency is a party are prohibited from performing investigative or 
prosecutorial functions. The remaining non-ALJ types either need no 
separation of functions because the agency has no other functions 
(5.9%), are prohibited from performing any function other than 
adjudication (11.8%), or have some other limitation (11.8%). Agencies 
appear more sensitive to the need for separation of functions in 
enforcement proceedings specifically. 
3. Ex Parte Communications 
Several APA provisions prohibit various kinds of ex parte 
communications with ALJs. ALJs may generally not have ex parte 
communications concerning facts at issue with anyone, but ALJs may 
discuss legal issues with others inside the agency, except employees who 
investigate or prosecute the case at issue or one factually related.162 The 
members of the agency, ALJs, and other employees reasonably expected 
to participate in the decisional process may not have ex parte 
communications with “interested person[s] outside the agency” 
concerning legal or factual issues in dispute.163 But they can discuss 
these issues with those inside the agency.164 
Figure  indicates that 21 of the 37 non-ALJ types (56.8%) reported 
that all ex parte communications are prohibited, 5 (13.5%) reported no 
ex parte communications are prohibited, and 11 (29.7%) reported that 
some ex parte communications are prohibited. Notably, the prohibition 
on all ex parte communications (as to both matters of fact and law) is 
stricter than even the APA standard for ALJs because the prohibition for 
non-ALJs extends to more than factual matters.165 This stricter 
prohibition is consistent with ACUS’s Model Adjudication Rule on 
prohibiting ex parte communications.166 
 
                                                     
162. Id. § 554(d). 
163. Id. § 557(d)(1). 
164. Id. 
165. Id. § 554(d)(2). 
166. See MODEL ADJUDICATION RULE 120(A) (ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. 2018) 
(“Except as required for the disposition of ex parte matters authorized by law, the Adjudicator may 
not consult a person or party on any matter relevant to the merits of the adjudication . . . .”). 
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Figure 5: 
Prohibitions on Ex Parte Communications (n=37) 
 
 
As indicated in Figure , agencies identified the sources of these 
prohibitions on ex parte communications—whether in statute, 
substantive rule (such as a notice-and-comment rule), procedural rule, 
internal agency guidance, or custom—for 12 non-ALJ types (with some 
having more than one source). 
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Notably, 76.2% of the agencies that answered this question indicated 
that the prohibitions come in the least accessible and transparent 
formats: internal guidance and custom. Agencies’ substantial reliance on 
custom is problematic because it is likely to be unwritten, opaque, and 
construed differently by individual non-ALJs. 
4. Physical Separation 
Relatedly, physical separation between adjudicators and other agency 
officials can help provide actual and psychological distance. It can lead 
to fewer causal interactions between the adjudicators and the other staff 
and bolster the impression of adjudicators’ independence. Nearly forty 
years ago, Professor Paul Verkuil reported that the Department of 
Interior’s physical separation and new titles for its non-ALJs led some to 
assert that the “resulting decisions on informal appeals are less 
intuitionally oriented, more objective and ultimately more fair.”167 He 
lauded the agency for its “internal agency reform that . . . substantially 
increased the impartiality of informal decision making at a low cost to 
the system.”168 
 
Figure  indicates our results concerning physical separation for non-
ALJs across the administrative state. Of the 37 non-ALJ types, only 
approximately half (18 of 37) are physically separated. One type 
(Hearing Officers for the FMC) is sometimes physically separated, while 
the remaining 18 types are not. The most troubling finding is that non-
ALJs in enforcement and government-contract proceedings are not 
always physically separated, despite the government’s heightened 
interest in these matters.169 
 
                                                     
167. Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 739, 787 
(1976). 
168. Id. 
169. Similarly, agencies reported that 47.1% of the non-ALJ types who hear matters in which the 
non-ALJs’ agency is a party (regardless of the nature of the hearing) is physically separated, and the 
same percentage is not physically separated. One type (or approximately 5.9%) is sometimes 
physically separated. 
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Figure 7: 
Physical Separation (n=37) 
 
 
5.  Performance Appraisals and Bonus Eligibility 
To increase ALJ independence from their agencies, ALJs are exempt 
from civil-service performance reviews and cannot receive bonuses from 
their agencies.170 We sought to ascertain whether non-ALJs had similar 
protections from agency oversight. 
First, we asked agencies whether the 37 types of non-ALJs were 
subject to performance reviews. If so, we asked about the nature of those 
reviews. Second, we asked whether the agency awarded bonuses to non-
ALJs. Finally, we asked whether the agency had set up any means of 
preventing the reviews from impacting the non-ALJs’ impartiality. 
A large proportion of non-ALJs by type and an even larger proportion 
by number are subject to performance reviews. Of the 37 types of non-
ALJs, 28 (or approximately 76%) are subject to performance reviews 
(Figure ).171 Of the 10,831 total non-ALJs, all but 68 are subject to 
performance reviews.172 Thus, an overwhelming 99.3% of all non-ALJs 
are subject to performance reviews ( 
                                                     
170. See Barnett, supra note 33, at 1655–56. 
171. The nine non-ALJ types without performance reviews were the Administrative Office of the 
Courts, DOD, Treasury (Labor Arbitrators), FDIC, GAO (five Personnel Appeals Board Members), 
the Library of Congress, NASA, NRC, and the Peace Corps. 
172. The number is so high because the more than 7,500 PTO adjudicators are subject to 
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Figure 9). Of the 10 agencies, not including the Department of 
Commerce, with more than 25 non-ALJs (see Table 1), 9 of them have 
performance reviews for their non-ALJs. 
 
Figure 8: 
Types Subject to Performance Reviews (n=37) 
 
 
                                                     
are as follows: Administrative Office of the Courts (1), DOD (22), GAO (5 Personnel Appeals 
Board Members), the Library of Congress (3), NASA (1), NRC (30), and the Peace Corps (6). The 
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Figure 9: 
Number of ALJs & Performance Reviews (n=10,831) 
 
 
As with several other factors that concern non-ALJ independence, we 
considered how frequently agencies conducted performance appraisals 
for non-ALJ types who preside over hearings in which the agency is a 
party. The appraisals could serve as a subtle (or not-so-subtle) method of 
influencing non-ALJ decisionmaking. Given the significant percentage 
of non-ALJ types and total number of non-ALJs who are subject to 
performance appraisals, we were not surprised to find that agencies 
conduct appraisals on 70.6% of non-ALJ types that hear proceedings in 
which agencies are a party (and for 89% of non-ALJ types that hear 
enforcement matters).173 This percentage, slightly smaller than the 
overall percentage of non-ALJ types subject to appraisals (75.7%), 
suggests some agency sensitivity to non-ALJ hearings in which the 
agency is a party. But the percentage is still substantial and indicates that 
agencies are using a suspect tool that may impugn non-ALJ 
independence in the proceedings where it is most sensitive. 
To understand the nature of the non-ALJs’ performance appraisals, 
we asked agencies to identify whether the appraisals included 
consideration of (1) case-processing goals, (2) input from litigants, 
(3) peer review, (4) review of the non-ALJs’ decisions themselves, 
                                                     
173. The use of performance appraisals for different kinds of non-ALJ hearings was fairly 
consistent. Agencies conduct appraisals for 100% of non-ALJ types that hear benefits matters, 
76.9% for federal employment disputes, 75.0% for licensing and for disputes between private 





NUMBER OF ALJS SUBJECT TO 
PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS?
Subject Not Subject
04 - Barnett (2).docx (Do Not Delete) 6/18/2019  7:57 PM 
2019] SOME KIND OF HEARING OFFICER 555 
 
(5) reversal rates of the non-ALJs’ decisions, or (6) other factors. We 
asked them to identify all that apply, and agencies reported information 
on the performance appraisals for 26 of the 28 non-ALJ types that are 
subject to performance appraisals.174 
 
Figure 10: 
Nature of Performance Appraisals (n=26) 
 
 
As Figure 10 indicates, the two most popular factors in non-ALJs’ 
performance appraisals are case-processing goals (for 80.8% of non-ALJ 
types for which we received responses) and review of non-ALJs’ 
decisions (69.2%). Litigant input, peer review, and reversal rates are 
relatively rare. 
The 11 “other” responses provided more, and sometimes concerning, 
detail. For example, agencies for certain non-ALJ types—such as the 
Department of Education’s AJs and HHS’s Departmental Appeals Board 
Members—also consider administrative responsibilities. The Coast 
Guard considers the non-ALJ’s adherence to agency guidance on 
“impartiality, fairness, and achieving the remedial goals of the civil-
penalty process.” Other agencies, such as the VA, echoed the Coast 
Guard by indicating that they consider compliance with statutes and 
regulations or “job knowledge.” The MSPB considered “government-
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wide performance standards.” SSA and Treasury reported considering 
vague (and potentially troubling) “business results.”175 
Unlike the uniform prohibition against agencies paying bonuses to 
their ALJs, agencies can generally pay their non-ALJs bonuses. We 
sought to determine how widespread the paying of bonuses was to non-
ALJs, and the size of these bonuses. Of the 28 non-ALJ types that are 
subject to performance appraisals, as Figure  indicates, 20 (or 
approximately 71.4%) of them are eligible for bonuses (and the 
responding official for two non-ALJ types for the FMC was unsure). Of 
the 10,831 reported non-ALJs, 9,799 (or approximately 90%) are 
eligible for bonuses (see  
Figure ).176 Of those types, all received bonuses last year (even if not 
every non-ALJ within a type received a bonus). 
 
                                                     
175. “Business results” is a vague phrase. Whose business does the criterion concern? If it is the 
Treasury’s business, what are the results that it seeks to obtain from the adjudications? If the agency 
seeks revenue generation, this would appear to reward adjudicators who favor the agency’s 
preferred outcome. Regardless of the phrase’s exact meaning, the lack of clarity does not provide 
helpful guidance to adjudicators or the public on the relevant criteria for non-ALJs’ performance 
evaluation. 
176. The following non-ALJs are eligible for bonuses (totaling 9,799): CFTC (15), PTAB (275), 
PTO (7,856), DOE (2), HHS (5), DOL/BRB (5), Treasury (714), EEOC (92), EPA (12), FLRA (40), 
FAO (40 Senior Attorneys), MSPB (70), NLRB (600), PBGC (6), RRB (6), and SSA (61). The 
largest groups of non-ALJs who are not eligible for bonuses are those that work for the VA (630) 
and DOJ/EOIR (326). 
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Figure 11: 





Bonus Eligibility, by Number of Non-ALJs (n=10,831) 
 
 
Of the 17 non-ALJ types who preside over matters in which their 
agencies are parties, more than 70% of those types are subject to 
performance appraisals, and 58.8% of them are eligible for bonuses. 
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which their agencies are parties may receive bonuses, a majority of them 
have annual performance appraisals that can affect their income. 
In response to our question asking how many non-ALJs received 
bonuses, some of the agencies reported how many non-ALJs within each 
type received bonuses in 2016. Figure  indicates the percentage of non-




Percentage of Non-ALJs Who Received Bonuses in 2017 (n=15) 
 
 
We concluded our inquiry on performance appraisals and bonuses by 
asking whether agencies that used performance appraisals took 
precautions to ensure that the appraisals did not interfere with non-ALJs’ 
impartiality. Contrary to the bonus ranges, we were able to categorize 
agency efforts to mitigate performance appraisals’ effects on 
impartiality. We categorized the reported precautions in Figure as 
(1) ignoring case outcomes, (2) crafting review standards or scoring to 
protect impartiality (likely very similar to “ignoring case outcomes”), 
(3) using some form of separation of functions and reporting 
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Figure 14: 
Nature of Precautions, Categorized (n=17) 
 
 
As indicated, approximately half of the reported precautions preclude 
consideration of case outcomes in performance appraisals, while 
approximately 35% consider the standards or scoring to limit discretion. 
Only one non-ALJ type has separation-of-functions-based protections, 
and only one has conflicts-of-interest principles to mitigate concerns. 
6. For-Cause Removal 
Agencies can remove ALJs for only “good cause established and 
determined by the [MSPB]” after a formal administrative hearing.177 
This limit on agencies’ ability to remove ALJs seeks to promote their 
impartiality. As the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly stated in the 
context of the president’s and principal officers’ power to remove other 
officials, “one who holds his office only during the pleasure of another, 
cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence 
against the latter’s will.”178 Although we were aware of a handful of 
non-ALJs with similar protection from at-will removal,179 we surveyed 
agencies to see if other non-ALJs had similar protections, whether 
                                                     
177. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2018). 
178. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010) (quoting 
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935)). 
179. See Barnett, supra note 33, at 1648 n.21 (discussing protections for certain Board of 
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pursuant to statute, regulation, or other source of law. Agencies 
responded for 36 of the 37 non-ALJ types. 
 
Figure 15: 
Protection from At-Will Removal (n=36) 
 
 
Of the 36 non-ALJs types, only three have reported protections from at-
will removal (Figure). EEOC Administrative Judges and NLRB Hearing 
Officers have protection from removal under their collective-bargaining 
agreement.180 The GAO’s AJs, as members of the GAO’s Personnel 
Appeals Board, can be removed only for good cause by a majority of the 
board (not including the member subject to removal) per statute.181 
The absence of protection from at-will removal, however, should not 
be given undue weight. Despite the lack of specific protection from at-
will removal, non-ALJs typically have civil-service protections that 
provide some insulation from possible improper agency retaliation in the 
performance-appraisal process.182 Their civil-service protection, 
however, is slightly different than that of ALJs. For ALJs, the MSPB 
                                                     
180. In their survey response, the EEOC further indicated that these protections come from 
“statute, regulation, [an] internal guidance document, and custom.” 
181. See 31 U.S.C. § 751(d) (2018). 
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itself decides whether good cause exists for removal.183 But for most of 
the civil service,184 an employing agency initially decides whether 
removal or discipline is appropriate either to “promote the efficiency of 
the service”185 or respond to “unacceptable performance.”186 That 
decision is subject to deferential administrative review by the MSPB.187 
Because merely providing a redundant good cause protection for non-
ALJs would not affect the MSPB’s role in the review, agencies’ efforts 
would likely be better spent providing guidance on defining how the 
relevant statutory terms (i.e., “efficiency of the service” and 
“unacceptable performance”) apply to agency adjudicators.188 
C. Problems with Achieving Optimal Impartiality 
Our data, along with data from Professor Michael Asimow’s earlier 
ACUS project concerning certain oral hearings,189 indicate that many 
agencies have at least some impartiality protections. But these data also 
indicate that non-ALJ adjudication is not uniform and that numerous 
non-ALJ types lack optimal impartiality provisions. Non-ALJs’ status is 
problematic for three reasons. 
First, non-ALJs’ impartiality provisions lack the stability of ALJs’. 
Custom and numerous forms of internal guidance require little effort to 
change, and any change will lack the salience of more formal action. For 
example, notice-and-comment rulemaking or even policy statements 
require publication in the Federal Register.190 (Indeed, as part of the co-
authored report to ACUS from which the reported data comes, we 
                                                     
183. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2018) (permitting adverse action against ALJs “only for good cause 
established and determined by the [MSPB] on the record after opportunity for hearing before the 
Board” (emphasis added)). 
184. Slightly different procedures apply to the “Senior Executive Service.” See 5 U.S.C. 
§ 3592(a) (requiring a hearing before an official whom the MSPB designates, but not permitting 
appeal to the MSPB itself). 
185. See 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a). 
186. BARNETT ET AL., supra note 77, at 69; see 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a). 
187. See 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(1) (reviewing under substantial evidence standard for “unacceptable 
performance” adverse actions and under “preponderance of the evidence” standard for efficiency-
based actions). 
188. BARNETT ET AL., supra note 77, at 69–70. 
189. See MICHAEL ASIMOW, SOURCEBOOK FOR FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION 
OUTSIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 31 tbl.3 (draft on file with author) (indicating 
whether particular studied agency-adjudication schemes adopt certain criteria related to “integrity of 
process”). 
190. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (requiring publication for interpretive rules and statements 
of policy). 
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recommended that agencies use notice-and-comment rulemaking for 
their impartiality provisions to increase those provisions’ transparency 
and salience.191) 
Second and relatedly, the hodgepodge of non-ALJ impartiality 
provisions undermines transparency because the provisions are often 
scattered among various authorities. Our data (not all of which is 
presented here) indicate that impartiality protections rest in a host of 
forms: notice-and-comment regulations, procedural rules, guidance 
documents, and custom. This variety of mechanisms for providing 
protections renders the protections less transparent. 
Indeed, our survey unexpectedly confirmed this intuition. In 
administering our survey, the EEOC at first sent the survey by mistake 
to numerous of its non-ALJs, instead of providing a single institutional 
answer. Numerous times, the responses were inconsistent. For instance, 
the responding non-ALJs provided disparate responses on hiring 
qualifications, the permissibility of ex parte communications (and 
sources of any limitations), eligibility for bonuses, the existence of case-
processing goals, limitations on other duties, and even the nature of 
administrative appellate review. Strikingly, some of the responding non-
ALJs indicated that the agency often relied upon custom for various 
limitations, the existence of which was apparently unknown to some of 
their colleagues. As these responses suggest, transparency benefits not 
only the public, but the agency and the non-ALJs, too. One agency’s 
transparency also benefits other agencies, which can more easily assess 
other agencies’ practices and consider those practices in fashioning their 
own procedural schemes. 
Finally, agencies do not appear to have considered norms for non-
ALJ independence in a holistic way. Any particular agency likely creates 
adjudicatory procedure infrequently, and the addition of new and 
expanded programs presumably arises more organically. Any focus on 
process is probably on the nature of the proceedings because that process 
is necessary for the first adjudication to begin and because that process 
must function as a relatively coherent scheme. Moreover, these 
procedural schemes can be borrowed from other adjudications and 
tailored in relatively short order. In contrast, impartiality protections are 
not as salient, especially because they are often prophylactic measures to 
mitigate any risk of partiality. 
                                                     
191. See BARNETT ET AL., supra note 77, at 71–72. 
04 - Barnett (2).docx (Do Not Delete) 6/18/2019  7:57 PM 
2019] SOME KIND OF HEARING OFFICER 563 
 
III. IMPARTIALITY DISCLOSURES 
Federal hearing officers’ impartiality protections are far from uniform 
or optimal, as measured against ALJs’ impartiality protections. Because 
of the problems in gathering information on them, it is difficult to 
discuss their status and, if necessary, ensure optimal impartiality. As a 
remedy, this Part proposes that agencies should use uniform disclosures 
like those primarily used in consumer-commercial contexts. Disclosure 
regimes provide a mechanism for improving hearing officers’ salience 
and indicia of impartiality. With improved salience, Congress will be in 
a better position as principal to determine whether government-wide 
legislation—perhaps via an “impartiality code”—is suitable. 
To be sure, Congress has used various reporting requirements to 
oversee agencies, and some literature discusses the history and concerns 
over the utility and costs of those reports.192 But the literature on 
consumer disclosure is a better guide for three reasons. First, the 
consumer-based literature is extremely well-developed theoretically and 
practically,193 while the congressional-reporting literature tends to 
concentrate on congressional reporting within a specific subject-matter 
area or statutory scheme,194 or, as especially true in the political-science 
literature, as part of a mix of congressional-oversight mechanisms.195 
Second, the impartiality disclosures are not only for Congress. Instead, 
they are for Congress, agencies, litigants, and scholars; in fact, my 
proposal does not call for direct reporting to Congress. Finally, unlike 
annual reports to Congress, which are often criticized for their cost and 
ineffectiveness, the proposed disclosure is an extremely concise 
document that does not require annual filing. 
                                                     
192. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 66–
67, 106 (2006) (discussing congressional reporting requirements). See generally Jonathan G. Pray, 
Comment, Congressional Reporting Requirements: Testing the Limits of the Oversight Power, 76 
U. COLO. L. REV. 297 (2005) (discussing history and criticism of congressional reporting 
requirements). 
193. See infra Section III.A. 
194. See generally Bruce D. Fisher, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: A False Hope for 
Whistleblowers, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 355 (1991); Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in 
the Implementation of Federal Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311 (1991); 
Joseph Carlton Elliott, Comment, Sleeping with One Eye Open: The Result of Non-Transparent 
Oversight by the Office of Refugee Resettlement on Facilities Sheltering Unaccompanied Alien 
Children, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 153 (2016). 
195. See DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION 
COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 128 (1999) (discussing 
broader relationship between Congress and Executive in policymaking); Beermann, supra note 192, 
at 66–67 (citing and discussing the political science literature on congressional monitoring). 
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A. Purposes of Impartiality Disclosures 
Consumer law has long relied upon disclosure models to further 
various related objectives in numerous areas, including rent-to-own,196 
credit,197 automobile-sales198 and automobile-lease,199 door-to-door,200 
securities,201 and banking transactions.202 Disclosures also have a 
prominent place in consumer privacy as to internet,203 financial,204 and 
health matters.205 The same objectives in the commercial context can, as 
discussed in this Section, also apply to the impartiality context. 
Consumer disclosure in a commercial context may not come to mind 
as a useful tool for improving adjudicatory procedure because consumer 
disclosure has a different primary purpose. In the consumer context, 
disclosure primarily promotes comparison shopping.206 Or, in the 
absence of comparison shopping, disclosure can serve a market function, 
providing information to a sufficient number of well-informed 
consumers to lead the market, through competing suppliers, to offer 
consumers better terms.207 These interrelated objectives are a primary 
animating feature of, among others, Truth in Lending (TILA) 
                                                     
196. See, e.g., N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 501 (McKinney 2018) (requiring specific notice and 
particular terms of rental agreement). 
197. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1602 (2018) (requiring specific disclosures for 
credit transactions). 
198. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Information & Cost Savings Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 32701–32705 
(2018) (requiring disclosure of odometer readings); 16 C.F.R. § 455 (2018) (requiring disclosures 
on window of cars for used-car sales); id. § 600 (requiring disclosures concerning fuel economy for 
new cars). 
199. Consumer Leasing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1667(a)–(f). 
200. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (requiring disclosure of consumer rights in a door-to-door sale, 
including right to cancel). 
201. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78l(b)(1) (requiring disclosure of 
numerous corporate details for securities registered on a national stock exchange for secondary 
trading); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77j (requiring disclosures for initial registration 
with the SEC). 
202. See, e.g., Truth in Savings Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4303 (2018); Electric Fund Transfers, 
12 C.F.R. § 1005.7 (2018) (disclosures related to debit transactions). 
203. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575 (West 2018) (requiring disclosure of online 
privacy policies). 
204. See, e.g., Graham-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6802 (requiring disclosures 
concerning financial privacy by financial institutions). 
205. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.520 (2018) (requiring privacy notices to patients concerning health 
information). 
206. See Jonathan M. Landers & Ralph Rohner, A Functional Analysis of Truth in Lending, 26 
UCLA L. REV. 711, 713 (1979). 
207. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect 
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 668–69 (1979). 
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disclosures, which apply to numerous credit transactions.208 Importantly 
for my purposes, this comparison-shopping purpose has only a 
tangential role for impartiality disclosure because agencies or Article I 
courts rarely compete with other tribunals for cases.209 
But subsidiary purposes for consumer disclosure can be key for 
impartiality disclosure. First, disclosure can provide a synopsis of 
critical contractual provisions.210 Indeed, this is one function of rent-to-
own disclosures, which must set out monthly payments, purchase price, 
various fees, and additional information on the nature of the rental 
transaction.211 For adjudicatory procedure, a disclosure regime can help 
assemble relevant terms and provide a synopsis of impartiality 
provisions. As indicated in Part II, the various indicia are not often 
transparently available, collected in one spot, or based on more than 
custom. The disclosures seek to cull the relevant criteria and provide a 
transparent mechanism for agencies, parties, interest groups, and 
Congress to understand and, if necessary, improve the protections for 
various kinds of hearing officers. For instance, just as securities 
disclosures can expose largely hidden underwriter or executive 
compensation,212 impartiality disclosure can bring, say, problematic ex 
parte practices to light. 
Second, consumer disclosures can provide a warning function to 
consumers that a particular term is far from ordinary. For instance, if a 
consumer determines that most credit for a particular purpose has an 
Annual Percentage Rate (APR) of 8%, a disclosed APR of 88% by one 
competitor will alert the consumer that something is amiss with the 
transaction.213 Similarly, disclosure can reveal (to lawyers, if not parties) 
outlier adjudications that, say, do not have limitations on ex parte 
                                                     
208. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful 
disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various 
credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit . . . .”). Nonetheless, many 
argue that disclosure largely fails at achieving these purposes because of consumers’ inability or 
disinterest in using disclosed information. See, e.g., OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, 
MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 183–84 (2014). 
209. The most prominent exceptions are certain commodities-related disputes at issue in CFTC v. 
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 836–37 (1986), or certain tax disputes. See David F. Shores, Deferential 
Review of Tax Court Decisions: Dobson Revisited, 49 TAX LAW. 629, 629 (1996) (discussing 
competition between the Tax Court, federal district courts, and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims). 
210. See JOHN A. SPANOGLE ET AL., CONSUMER LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 266 (4th ed. 2013). 
211. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1812.621 (West 2018) (describing purpose of disclosures and 
other provisions as “ensuring that consumers are adequately informed of all relevant terms” and 
“protected from misrepresentations and unfair dealings”). 
212. See Dalley, supra note 43, at 1096. 
213. See Landers & Rohner, supra note 206, at 737. 
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communications or recusal requirements. It may be that a critical 
characteristic of independence is justifiably absent for a set of hearing 
officers. But the disclosures can ensure that the indicium’s absence is not 
merely the result of agency or congressional carelessness. To further this 
warning function, the disclosures must be relatively uniform to permit 
comparison of similar transactions or forms of agency action, and they 
must present important information in a salient way.214 
Relatedly, if concerns arise over particular adjudications, the 
disclosures can help identify missing impartiality protections that may 
help mitigate those concerns. This divergence between optimal 
impartiality protections and those that the adjudicator has can reveal an 
“impartiality gap.” Recall, for instance, two of our introductory 
examples. 
The SEC ALJs have APA impartiality protections, and thus they have 
optimal impartiality protections as measured against the APA’s 
provisions. But concerns over internal pressure at the SEC to rule for the 
agency suggests that the APA’s provisions do not guarantee impartiality 
or freedom from agency pressure. To mitigate concerns over interagency 
pressure, the SEC could provide additional physical separation for its 
ALJs from the rest of the agency. 
Immigration judges, as a second example, have many of the 
recommended protections including hiring qualifications, prohibitions 
on other functions and ex parte communications, physical separation, 
and the lack of eligibility for bonuses. But they are subject to 
performance reviews, and they lack special protection from removal.215 
The current concern is that these performance reviews are not crafted to 
divorce substantive outcomes in decided cases from the performance 
review and any discipline that may follow.216 
Impartiality gaps may seem obvious for high-profile adjudications 
like those for the SEC or for immigration matters. But even with high-
profile examples, the identification of impartiality gaps can help focus 
attention on the specific nature of the problem, such as the nature of 
performance appraisals and the lack of defined protection from at-will 
removal, within the larger context of administrative adjudication. For 
less salient adjudications, these disclosures may be the only way in 
which the absence of impartiality protections comes to light. For 
instance, the 535 Decision Review Officers for the VA have no 
                                                     
214. See id. at 738. 
215. ACUS Response Spreadsheet, Types of Non-ALJs (on file with author). 
216. See id. 
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prohibitions on ex parte communications, no separations of functions, no 
physical separation, performance appraisals, and no especial protection 
from at-will removal.217 These missing protections suggest a significant 
impartiality gap that may otherwise go unnoticed. 
Third, consumer disclosure creates trust between parties to an 
agreement. This practice furthers dignitary interests by allowing 
consumers the opportunity to read and understand the nature of the 
transactions.218 This value may be more pronounced in the impartiality 
context.219 With process, the regulated individuals may have no choice 
about the process or tribunal. But disclosure can ensure that the 
government recognizes the individual’s interest in understanding the 
nature of the adjudication, and it can improve the individual’s and 
public’s trust in agency action by removing concern over inadvertently 
or purposefully opaque procedure. The clarity that disclosure provides 
may be especially useful in a context in which the hearing officers often 
have the title “judge” but lack protections that laypeople and even 
lawyers would presuppose. That said, as discussed in Section III.C, 
disclosure will improve litigants’ satisfaction with negative outcomes 
and thereby create public trust only if a disclosure reveals well-
conceived impartiality protections or if disclosure of lackluster 
impartiality provisions nudges the agency towards adopting them. 
Fourth, consumer disclosure can guide consumers towards certain 
normative preferences. For instance, Congress determined that its 
longstanding required word-based warnings on tobacco products were 
not effectively countering consumers’ biases or miscalculation of 
tobacco’s health risks.220 To account for consumers’ insufficient 
appreciation of health risks, Congress replaced those warnings with 
graphic pictures of lung disease to invoke an emotional response in 
potential tobacco users.221 In the procedural context, the agency may not 
                                                     
217. Id. 
218. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 
U. PA. L. REV. 647, 734–35 (2011) (discussing asserted dignitary value to disclosure and related 
authorities); cf. Richard W. Bourne, Medical Malpractice: Should Courts Force Doctors to Confess 
Their Own Negligence to Their Patients, 61 ARK. L. REV. 621, 623 (2009) (considering the 
disclosure of professional errors to affected patients). 
219. See David Aaron, Ethics, Law Enforcement, and Fair Dealing: A Prosecutor’s Duty to 
Disclose Nonevidentiary Information, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3005, 3015 (1999) (noting 
government’s responsibility to protect dignitary interests in criminal law because of the 
government’s role as representing society). 
220. Id. 
221. Ryan Bubb, TMI? Why the Optimal Architecture of Disclosure Remains TBD, 113 MICH. L. 
REV. 1021, 1028–36 (2015) (discussing the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act 
of 2009, 21 U.S.C. § 387 (2018)). 
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need to ascertain risks in the same ways as a potential smoker might. But 
the APA and the Court’s due process jurisprudence suggest that agencies 
provide optimal independence for hearing officers when they address 
hearing officers’ hiring, pay, removal, and decisionmaking process. 
Disclosures can encourage agencies to adopt optimal process by creating 
a mechanism for public shame if their hearing officers’ structured 
independence deviates from optimal and—if the disclosure is effective—
more standardized design. Even without shame, disclosure can help 
channel “herd behavior”—getting agencies to follow what they perceive 
others to be doing.222 This herding can mitigate some concerns over 
agencies lacking expertise in designing impartiality protections without 
significant guidance. 
Fifth, impartiality disclosures can reduce principal-agency costs, a 
purpose that is less often germane to consumer transactions.223 By 
having agencies disclose key procedural provisions in a transparent and 
understandable fashion, Congress can better monitor agencies to 
ascertain how agencies are using their delegated authority. A meaningful 
disclosure regime that creates a synopsis of important terms and permits 
easy comparison of similar agency action is much more useful to a 
principal than a disclosure regime in which the information is found in 
numerous materials and requires the principal to synthesize and analyze 
the information. Indeed, Congress requires something similar in other 
spheres. For instance, it requires agencies to file impact statements for 
government actions with major environmental effects. Congress also 
requires under the Community Reinvestment Act224 that banks (with all 
of the benefits that national banking laws provide them225) disclose their 
outreach to various disadvantaged communities when seeking 
regulators’ approval of pending mergers.226 In both of these examples, 
                                                     
222. Dalley, supra note 43, at 1115. 
223. See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1047, 1048 (1995) (“[T]he principal purpose of mandatory disclosure [in securities markets, 
as opposed to other consumer transactions] is to address certain agency problems that arise between 
corporate promoters and investors, and between corporate managers and shareholders. Disclosure 
can help reduce the cost of monitoring promoters’ and managers’ use of corporate assets for self-
interested purposes.”). 
224. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2908 (2018). 
225. See generally Mehrsa Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1283 (2014) (describing how banking charters are intended to inure to the public’s benefit). 
226. See, e.g., Dalley, supra note 43, at 1122–23 (noting that Community Reinvestment Act 
disclosure, as part of banking mergers, has led to changes in lending practices); Cheryl Lee, 
Amalgamation of the Southern California Banking Industry: San Diego a Microcosm, 35 CAL. W. 
L. REV. 41, 116 (1998) (“Along with federal and state antitrust laws that apply to interstate banking, 
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Congress uses disclosure regimes to influence agent actors or regulated 
parties’ behavior and to render their action more salient to interested 
parties, which, in turn, can alert congressional monitors. 
Finally, consumer disclosures can also have a law-reform function by 
revealing what were once unfair, hidden terms.227 Disclosure may be a 
tool for centering public attention on a particular issue.228 For instance, 
the complexity and incomprehensibility of disclosed provisions led to a 
movement in the states for “simple English forms”229 in consumer 
contracts and in certain federal privacy disclosures.230 In the impartiality 
context, disclosure can help reveal problematic non-ALJ regimes in one 
adjudication, in one agency, or across the administrative state.231 A 
disclosure would become a tool of numerous constituencies—agencies 
themselves, Congress, and interest groups—to improve the status quo.232 
Importantly, disclosure in general is useful for reform objectives even if 
some constituencies or litigants ignore the disclosures. As in the 
consumer context, only some actors need to understand and use 
disclosures for them to have a meaningful impact on a disclosing party’s 
practice.233 
B. Key Considerations for Impartiality Disclosure 
Despite disclosure’s utility, it can prove unhelpful or even backfire. 
As Professor Daniel E. Ho has demonstrated, unthoughtful disclosures 
can fail to further their underlying goals. For instance, he notes that 
disclosures can be too complicated for consumers’ use, as with Safe 
Drinking Water Act disclosures234 or credit disclosures.235 Or disclosures 
                                                     
the Federal Reserve Board must also consider Community Reinvestment Act compliance in 
connection with any merger or acquisition application.”). 
227. See Landers & Rohner, supra note 206, at 741. 
228. See Dalley, supra note 43, at 1112. 
229. See Landers & Rohner, supra note 206, at 741 n.101. 
230. 16 C.F.R. § 313.3 (2018) (requiring that the certain privacy notices under the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act be “reasonably understandable” and defining the concept in great detail). 
231. See Dalley, supra note 43, at 1110–11 (noting that disclosure of securities information can 
be useful to the government itself in determining how to better regulate). 
232. See Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309, 1379 
(2015) (noting how disclosure that consumers understand can lead consumers to think more deeply 
about the matter at issue and create a bridge to substantive regulation). 
233. See, e.g., SPANOGLE ET AL., supra note 210, at 266 (discussing the market-function of 
consumer disclosure and the need for some consumers to pay attention to the disclosures). 
234. See Daniel E. Ho, Designing Information Disclosure, 38 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 13, 13 (2012). 
235. The comprehensibility problem with TILA disclosures is a longstanding one. See Jeffrey 
Davis, Revamping Consumer-Credit Contract Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1345–46 (1982) (pointing 
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can be so inaccessible—such as privacy disclosures in obscure 
locations236 or provided with other abundant information237—that they 
are unlikely to prove effective.238 Even restaurant health disclosures—
”widely considered a paragon of disclosure regulation”239 due to their 
easy-to-understand and prominent letter grades based on an inspector’s 
underlying rubric—can do little to signal degrees of sanitation if the 
grading lacks consistency among inspectors, suffers from grade 
inflation, or has so many detailed grading objectives that they hinder 
reliability among different inspectors.240 Perhaps even worse, disclosures 
can have unintended consequences that exacerbate harms that the 
disclosure seek to mitigate. For instance, calorie disclosures can lead 
restaurant patrons to increase their calorie consumption by purchasing 
several lower-calorie foods that in the aggregate have more calories than 
a single high-calorie item.241 
This Section considers the main issues in the design of impartiality 
disclosures. After determining which values the disclosures seek to 
further, one must consider which criteria are germane to those 
underlying values, how to communicate the information in the 
disclosure, and how to distribute the disclosure to ensure that the 
relevant audiences can easily find the disclosed information. And, of 
course, the disclosure design must ensure that the costs of the disclosure 
are less than its benefits. 
                                                     
to studies indicating that TILA has had no market impact and stating that “[t]he resulting [TILA] 
disclosure statement is nearly incomprehensible to the average consumer; the information essential 
to making good credit-use decisions lies buried under mounds of superfluous data”). 
236. Although California is one of the few states to require disclosure of privacy policies, see 
SPANOGLE ET AL., supra note 210, at 532, those policies need not be posted on the company’s 
webpage; they may instead be posted as a hyperlink on the “first significant page after entering the 
Web site.” See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575(a), 22577(b)(1) (West 2018). 
237. Regulations to Gramm-Leach-Bliley financial disclosures permit sellers to “combine [the 
required disclosures] with other information,” creating an incentive for sellers to bury the 
disclosures in other consumer correspondence. Regulation P, 12 C.F.R. § 1016.3(b)(2)(ii)(E) 
(2018). 
238. See Dalley, supra note 43, at 1091. If consumers notice privacy-policy disclosures, they are 
likely to misunderstand their import. “[I]nstead of reading the policies, consumers assume that a 
firm with a ‘privacy policy’ has a policy of keeping consumer data private”—though a privacy 
policy may indicate that the firm will widely share the consumer’s information. Willis, supra note 
232, at 1326.  
239. Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure and Restaurant Grading, 122 
YALE L.J. 574, 582 (2012). 
240. See id. at 611–14, 640–41. 
241. See Ho, supra note 234, at 13. 
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1. Designing the Disclosure 
Ascertaining the appropriate criteria concerning hearing-officer 
impartiality is the relatively easy part because the germane factors for 
optimal hearing-officer independence are the familiar ones from the 
APA, the Court’s due process jurisprudence, and my recent survey: 
x Hiring process (including who hires and established criteria, 
if any, for hiring); 
x Separation of functions; 
x Supervisory relationship within the agency; 
x Ex parte communications; 
x Physical separation; 
x Performance appraisals; 
x Eligibility for performance bonuses; and 
x Protection from at-will removal 
The more difficult questions concern the design of the disclosure. 
The disclosure must also be a concise document. The longer the 
document, the less likely that it will be read and the more likely that the 
information will be obscured.242 If it is not read, the document cannot 
prove a meaningful warning, shame sufficiently to push agencies in a 
better direction, or clearly identify concerns for congressional 
consideration. Relatedly, brevity permits the disclosure to provide a 
synopsis, as opposed to an exposition, of the hearing-officer’s status. By 
limiting the disclosure to the eight criteria listed above with a limited 
agency response for each criterion, the disclosure will better achieve its 
purposes. Because comparison among agencies and adjudications is 
necessary to further nearly all of these goals, the disclosures must also 
be uniform.243 
The concise disclosure must also be readable for lay litigants and 
attorneys who do not delve into adjudicatory structure frequently. The 
disclosure should be written in a readable font that seeks to ensure, in as 
                                                     
242. See Bubb, supra note 221, at 1026; Dalley, supra note 43, at 1115. Moreover, firms are 
aware that psychological forces (such as a line of people waiting impatiently behind a customer with 
disclosures in hand at a car-rental counter) can dissuade consumers from reading disclosures. See 
Willis, supra note 232, at 1325. 
243. The use of uniformity to permit comparison is a feature of numerous disclosure regimes. 
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 4301(a) (2018) (stating that Congress requires uniform disclosures to improve 
competition and consumer decisionmaking under the Truth in Savings Act); Rule Notice, Truth in 
Lending, 65 Fed. Reg. 17,129 (Sept. 27, 2000) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2018)) (stating that 
“[u]niformity in creditors’ disclosures [under the Truth in Lending Act] is intended to assist 
consumers in comparison shopping”). 
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plain of language as possible, that the recipient can understand the nature 
and import of the terms.244 For instance, the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, when revising its disclosure forms for certain 
residential mortgages not only used statutorily-mandated terms, such as 
“finance charge” and “Annual Percentage Rate (APR),” but also 
explanations of what the terms meant (and did not mean).245 As one 
example, with APR, the agency briefly defined it as “[y]our costs over 
the loan term expressed as a rate. This is not your interest rate.”246 The 
agency did so to mitigate consumer confusion, uncovered in its testing, 
between the APR (which includes interest, fees, and other costs of the 
loan) and interest rates.247 
Disclosures often follow one of two models—what I refer to as either 
a “presentation model” or a “synthesis model.” Under the former, the 
disclosure simply presents the required criteria without attempting to 
synthesize or analyze it for recipients. Forms for TILA, the Truth in 
Savings Act, and Rent-to-Own transactions, among others, follow this 
model by mandating the disclosure of information like costs and fees 
without assessing the desirability of the particular transaction. The 
synthesis model, in contrast, takes the applicable criteria and analyzes it 
to provide the recipient with a conclusion as to this subject of the 
disclosure. Perhaps the most well-known example of the synthesis model 
is the earlier mentioned letter-grade-based disclosure system for 
restaurants. Similarly, based on their algorithms, publications rank 
universities and colleges to help students and schools evaluate the “best” 
schools. 
The benefit of the presentation model is that it does not require an 
intermediary to administer or a reliable rubric to ensure consistency 
among numerous intermediaries. But its downside is that it leaves the 
disclosure recipient to make sense of the presented information. The 
                                                     
244. Matters like font and placement are ubiquitous factors in disclosure design. See Willis, supra 
note 232, at 1349–50. The FTC has indicated that these are “important considerations,” but they are not 
sufficient to ensure effective disclosure. FTC, .COM DISCLOSURES: HOW TO MAKE EFFECTIVE 
DISCLOSURES IN DIGITAL ADVERTISING 1 (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-
language/bus41-dot-com-disclosures-information-about-online-advertising.pdf [http://perma.cc/N6BQ-
JJTV]. 
245. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, TILA–RESPA INTEGRATED DISCLOSURE: GUIDE TO THE 




247. Rule Notice, Integrated Mortgage Disclosures Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures 
Act (Regulation X) and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 79,730, 79,979 (Dec. 
31, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024, 1026 (2018)). 
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synthesis model’s beneficial feature, in contrast, is that it can provide an 
understandable compilation of the tested variables in a format that is 
very familiar to those outside the targeted industry. The downside is that 
it requires an intermediary to provide the synthesis. The presence of 
more than an evaluator or grader requires checks for consistency and 
reliability in grading; the use of an algorithm requires validity testing 
and attention to whether subject parties can “game” the algorithm.248 The 
simplicity of the letter grade or ranking also may obscure the complexity 
in the grading variables and application. 
For impartiality disclosures, the presentation model is preferable. By 
limiting the disclosed criteria, the disclosure can effectively provide 
information that furthers the purposes of the disclosure (synopsis, 
warning, etc.), especially for lawyers, Congress, and the agencies 
themselves. To be sure, less sophisticated litigants may appreciate a 
synthesis model with, say, a letter grade that evaluates the hearing 
officer’s independence. But that model would create significant costs: 
deciding who evaluates, assuring reliability in creating a grading rubric, 
determining how to ensure valid rubrics after accounting for legitimate 
reasons for certain hearing officers to deviate from the norm, and 
preventing the inadvertent masking of potential impartiality failings 
within the grading calculus. By calling for an explanation only when 
agencies answer a certain way, the presentation-model disclosure can 
subtly indicate when agencies are deviating from the optimal course. 
Finally, the agencies must consider for which of their hearing officers 
they should provide a disclosure. Defining non-ALJ hearings is 
notoriously difficult because of their varied characteristics. The agencies 
could choose to use our definition (i.e., hearings in which the parties can 
seek an oral, evidentiary hearing).249 Or they may choose to use a 
similar, although perhaps narrower definition from another ACUS 
project. In an earlier project, ACUS adopted a definition of “Type B” 
hearings: mandatory evidentiary hearings (whether written or oral) that 
have an exclusive record and are not heard by ALJs.250 For ease of 
                                                     
248. See Dalley, supra note 43, at 1128 (discussing “gaming” by law schools for the U.S. News 
and World Report survey and bypass-surgery report cards). 
249. For the full definition, see supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
250. See MICHAEL ASIMOW, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., ADJUDICATION OUTSIDE THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 5, 10 (2016) (defining “evidentiary hearing” and distinguishing “Type 
B” hearings from “Type C” hearings), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/adjudication-
outside-the-administrative-procedure-act-draft-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6H5-X8F6]; Adoption of 
Recommendations, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,314 (Dec. 13, 2016). The main difference between the definitions is that 
the one in our report only includes oral hearings, and it did not require an exclusive record or that the 
hearing be mandatory (as opposed to those that the agency had to hold upon a party’s request). 
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categorization, agencies may prefer limiting the relevant non-ALJ 
hearings to those with exclusive records, those that permit oral 
proceedings, or those that are mandatory. Regardless of how different 
definitions alter the domain of the disclosures, the disclosures can prove 
useful for numerous agencies and proceedings. 
Appendix A provides a model form based on these considerations.251 
2. Distribution 
A successful disclosure requires appropriate distribution to render it 
more likely that recipients will use disclosure to achieve its purposes. To 
that end, the agency should include it with other materials that it 
provides at the initiation of a hearing and in the same format as those 
other materials, whether as a separate document, conspicuous link, or 
conspicuous attachment.252 By ensuring that the party receives it at the 
beginning of the hearing, it renders it more likely that the party can take 
any actions necessary to preserve issues concerning the hearing officer’s 
independence.253 
The agency should also place the disclosure with other materials 
(such as rules, docket pages, and other guidance) on its website. Not 
only are some regulated parties likely to find the disclosure online, 
conspicuous posting makes it easier for other agencies, congressional 
staffs, and other interested parties to find the document for particular 
proceedings. Indeed, ACUS has recently adopted a recommendation for 
agencies to make their adjudicatory materials more conspicuously 
available on their websites.254 
Agencies should also send their disclosures to a clearinghouse only as 
they create or revise them. Collecting all disclosures will better enable 
scholars or government actors to synthesize government-wide practice 
and consider any appropriate uniform reforms. Annual disclosure to the 
clearinghouse would likely prove too burdensome and, if the impartiality 
                                                     
251. See infra Appendix A. 
252. If the agency chooses to provide paper copies, the costs of disclosure will increase. To 
mitigate these costs, the agency could choose to print the disclosure on the back of another 
document, as long as the front of the document clearly puts the recipient on notice of the 
disclosure’s existence on the back of the page. 
253. Some disclosure regimes require certain recurring disclosures. See DEE PRIDGEN & 
RICHARD ALDERMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW § 8:4 (2018) (discussing timing of open-
end-credit TILA disclosures); id. § 13:17 (discussing annual Gramm-Leach-Bliley financial-
information disclosures). Disclosures concerning hearing officers do not need to occur more than 
once. It is difficult to see what benefit repeated disclosure would provide, especially if the 
disclosures are available online with the hearing’s other materials. 
254. See Adoption of Recommendations, 82 Fed. Reg. 31,039 (June 16, 2017). 
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provisions are static after their creation, unnecessary. But the downside 
is that agencies may simply not remember to submit revised disclosures, 
and they may largely forget, without the nudge of an annual reporting 
requirement, to think about whether to update their disclosures. On 
balance, other constituencies may be able to help nudge the agency into 
reconsidering the disclosures and impartiality protections if necessary, 
and an annual (or biannual) reminder by the clearinghouse may help 
assuage fears of agencies overlooking the disclosures once they have 
drafted them. Agencies should send the disclosures in a format to the 
clearinghouse that allows machine-based reading and analysis,255 so that 
the clearinghouse can easily identify outliers and analyze trends or 
characteristics across all federal agency adjudication. 
ACUS is one possible clearinghouse because its mission is “to 
promote improvements in the efficiency, adequacy, and fairness of the 
procedures by which federal agencies conduct regulatory 
programs . . . through scholarly research” and recommendations to 
Congress and agencies.256 Indeed, ACUS not only commissioned the 
underlying empirical project discussed here on hearing officers’ 
independence, but they have recently focused on agency adjudication 
and created an online database of information on agency adjudications of 
all stripes.257 To be sure, serving as a clearinghouse would be a new duty 
for ACUS. Yet, unlike regimes with annual disclosures or disclosures 
that potentially apply to all recurring substantive agency decisions (such 
as certain rulemakings),258 the impartiality disclosures would require 
only initial and revised disclosures for any relevant non-ALJ 
adjudication. Of course, to assess a suitable government clearinghouse 
(whether ACUS or another entity), one would have to consider the 
agency’s budget, other duties, and staffing—considerations that are 
outside the scope of this Article. 
Finally, if necessary, these disclosures should be mandatory. Based on 
agencies’ high response rate to our survey, I am hopeful that agencies 
                                                     
255. See Ho, supra note 234, at 580–81 (discussing guidance from the Obama Administration’s 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs on machine-readable disclosures). 
256. David M. Pritzker, ACUS in a Nutshell, ADMIN. CONF. U.S. (July 17, 2013), 
https://www.acus.gov/newsroom/administrative-fix-blog/acus-nutshell [https://perma.cc/C263-L5G8]. 
257. For a collection of ACUS reports concerning adjudication, see Adjudication, ADMIN. CONF. 
U.S., https://www.acus.gov/past-projects/adjudication [https://perma.cc/E9KY-SFJN]; Ongoing 
Projects, ADMIN. CONF. U.S., https://www.acus.gov/current-projects [https://perma.cc/9MFK-3A8T]. 
258. See, e.g., Beermann, supra note 192, at 83–84 (discussing the Congressional Review Act); 
Doris S. Freedman et al., The Regulatory Flexibility Act: Orienting Federal Regulation to Small 
Business, 93 DICK. L. REV. 439, 442 (1989) (discussing annual reporting by the Small Business 
Administration under the Regulatory Flexibility Act). 
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will voluntarily disclose. Voluntary disclosure is a good starting point, 
and an agency’s mere refusal to disclose voluntarily may provide 
sufficient signaling to Congress to inquire further. But given agencies’ 
practice of turning away from ALJs and failing to provide non-ALJs 
similar protections, I am skeptical that a sufficient number of agencies 
will voluntarily disclose non-ALJ protections. After all, as I have argued 
elsewhere, agencies have largely (though wrongly) determined that the 
current system of using non-ALJs with lesser independence benefits 
them.259 The mandate, if necessary, can come from two sources. As a 
helpful start, the White House (likely through OMB) could mandate 
disclosure for executive agencies in the manner proposed here. The 
downsides are that OMB’s relationship with independent agencies is 
fraught and that OMB (through its Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs) focuses primarily on agency rulemaking, not adjudication.260 
The other option is for Congress to mandate the disclosures via statute. 
The benefit is that agencies will be required to comply. But, as proposed 
revisions to the APA have demonstrated over the decades,261 statutory 
change to administrative process comes slowly, if at all. The lack of 
political valence as to impartial agency adjudicators gives one more 
hope for these disclosures, however. After all, progressives want 
impartial non-ALJs who preside over hearings with vulnerable 
populations (say, immigrants),262 while conservatives seek to ensure a 
fair administrative process for corporate regulated entities.263 
C. Possible Objections 
Disclosure is no panacea. There are legitimate concerns about its use 
and effectiveness. But these objections do not undermine disclosure’s 
utility in the impartiality context. 
First, congressional action, especially if providing uniform treatment 
to hearing officers, would be a more efficient and effective way of 
regulating impartiality. Moreover, the concerns over substantive 
                                                     
259. See generally Barnett, supra note 33, at 1670–1708. 
260. See KEITH WERHAN, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 101–09 (2d ed. 2014). 
261. See generally Christopher J. Walker, Modernizing the Administrative Procedure Act, 69 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 629 (2017) (discussing earlier attempted reforms of the APA and current pending ones). 
262. See generally Jill E. Family, Immigration Law Allies and Administrative Law Adversaries, 
32 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 99 (2017). 
263. See generally Jean Eaglesham, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Criticizes SEC’s In-House 
Court, WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-chamber-of-commerce-
criticizes-secs-in-house-court-1436932861 [https://perma.cc/LCL3-Y49G] (discussing concern over 
the partiality of SEC ALJs by industry and its interest group, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce). 
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regulation in the consumer context—that it stifles innovation and can 
lead to inefficiencies in the market264—do not apply here assuming that 
the impartiality criteria are optimal and fixed for all hearing officers. 
But, as indicated earlier, the lack of information up to this point on 
hearing officers—both as to their significant place in the bureaucracy 
and their protections—has rendered substantive regulation by 
congressional oversight difficult. Of course, the data presented here, as 
well as from other sources, provide Congress a basis to begin its 
oversight. But agency-provided disclosures can provide updated data, 
citations, and explanations for all relevant non-ALJ hearings (not just the 
ones that voluntarily respond). In short, impartiality disclosure is a first 
step in helping bring about improvement—whether from agencies in the 
first instance or from congressional oversight. 
Second, disclosure regimes have largely been deemed failures and 
thus their efficacy here may be in doubt.265 But the aims of consumer 
disclosure and impartiality disclosure differ. The most trenchant 
criticism of disclosure regimes concerns their inability to alter consumer 
behavior.266 Here, it is not the consumers’ behavior that we seek to 
change. Instead, we seek to change the provider’s behavior (the agency) 
or the overseer’s (Congress). 
But, relatedly, might the disclosures normalize lackluster impartiality 
protections if it turns out that most agencies have not sufficiently 
protected their adjudicators’ impartiality? This is a possibility, but there 
are good reasons to think that result would not materialize. If an 
agency’s more ample protections have worked well, the agency has little 
incentive to race to the bottom. Were an agency, however, to justify its 
minimal protections by pointing to other agencies’ minimal practices, 
other constituencies—litigants, Congress, or interest groups—could 
pressure the agency to change. In short, once information permits 
numerous constituencies to identify problems, the chance for mitigation 
or resolution is higher than if the problem remains shrouded. 
In fact, well-designed process can inure to an agency’s benefit by 
increasing the chances that losing litigants accept the proceedings as 
                                                     
264. See Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of 
Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 715 (2006). 
265. See Willis, supra note 232, at 1321–22. 
266. See Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward 
a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 148–49 (2006) 
(discussing the problems with disclosure-regimes as regulation). See generally BEN-SHAHAR & 
SCHNEIDER, supra note 208 (discussing the various ways in which consumer disclosure has failed to 
inform or alter consumer behavior). 
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generally fair. Social psychologists’ work on procedural justice have 
demonstrated that procedural fairness affects how parties perceive the 
fairness of a decision’s outcome.267 Although they did not consider the 
effect of impartiality itself, some studies have demonstrated that effects 
of procedural fairness or the lack thereof are strongest when parties 
suffer a negative outcome under the process.268 The wrinkle here is that 
impartiality disclosures may exacerbate losing parties’ dissatisfaction 
with agency adjudications by calling litigants’ attention to impartiality 
gaps. Yet, filling those gaps or disclosing well-designed impartiality 
provisions can improve losing litigants’ satisfaction with agency 
adjudication. Impartiality disclosures, accordingly, may increase 
dissatisfaction in the short-term but serve as a catalyst for decreasing 
that dissatisfaction in the long run. 
Third, it is unclear whether any of the relevant constituencies will use 
the disclosure.269 Consumers, for instance, are overwhelmed with 
disclosed information, rendering it easy to tune out, click through, or use 
in incorrect ways.270 In fact, regulated entities in the consumer context 
often intentionally present their disclosures in ways that ensure that they 
are not read.271 Moreover, the cost of additional disclosure is often 
miniscule, or at least appears so, exacerbating hyper-disclosure and 
consumers’ negative reactions to it.272 In contrast, there is a dearth of 
impartiality disclosure, and the model form is intended to address the 
concern over hyper-disclosure by limiting the variables that are 
addressed on the one-page disclosure. Unlike consumer disclosures, 
which are often provided shortly before a transaction is consummated,273 
these impartiality disclosures are intended to be a starting point for 
agencies and Congress to focus their attention on important criteria as 
                                                     
267. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 67 
(1988). 
268. See id. at 67–69. 
269. See Bubb, supra note 221, at 1021. 
270. See id. at 1026 (discussing phenomenon of “decision aversion” in which consumers invest as 
little time as possible in decisionmaking and thus ignore disclosures). 
271. See Willis, supra note 232, at 1322–23. 
272. See Bubb, supra note 221, at 1021; Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information 
Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 434–47 (2003) 
(discussing problems with understanding and processing ever-increasing disclosure in securities 
markets). 
273. See, e.g., Nash v. First Fin. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 703 F.2d 233, 238 (7th Cir. 1983) (“There is 
abundant authority for the proposition that a violation of [the Truth in Lending] Act occurs when the 
new credit transaction is ‘consummated’, or when credit is extended, without the requisite 
disclosure having been made.”). 
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working groups, committees, and managers think about how to provide 
optimal impartiality. These groups can turn to ACUS recommendations 
and reports and scholarship that provide agencies’ guidance on non-ALJ 
impartiality.274 After using the disclosures to focus on problematic 
hearing-officer regimes, agencies and Congress can seek more 
information as necessary to address specific problems. 
Fourth, agency disclosure is not costless. But the costs of disclosure—
especially as minimal as this one-page disclosure is when compared to 
pages and pages of various consumer disclosures for one transaction or 
reports to Congress—are largely ones that Congress has accepted in 
numerous other areas. And the costs should be compared to the benefits, 
which, as discussed in Section III.A., are likely more significant in this 
context than in the consumer one. Moreover, the costs for impartiality 
disclosures are largely upfront costs, where the agency (re)considers its 
non-ALJ hearings and completes the disclosure. The transmission costs 
of posting to the internet and transmitting it to a clearinghouse are slight. 
More significant costs, however, arise from routine distribution to 
litigants (if the agency does not simply provide a website link to its 
disclosure), the clearinghouse’s duties, and any agency’s duties in 
enforcing a mandatory-disclosure regime. This Article is not the place to 
attempt to quantify those costs but, given the numerous other disclosure 
regimes that Congress requires, the costs here are likely similar in kind 
to, yet much smaller in degree than, those for other programs. 
Congressional budgeting professionals can very likely assess these costs 
in short order. 
Finally, the use of disclosures would not encourage transparency for 
what Professor David Pozen has recently suggested are nefarious ends. 
Pozen contends that transparency suffers from ideological drift.275 
Transparency was originally a tool by progressives to further goals such 
as professionalizing government, fairness, and mitigating agency 
capture.276 But transparency has morphed into a tool to obstruct 
government, whether by inundating agencies with requests under the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA); demanding open meetings that 
perversely push lobbyists into private meetings with regulators; 
                                                     
274. See Barnett, supra note 33 (recommending that agencies use ALJs because of their statutory 
protections); Adoption of Recommendations, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,312 (Dec. 13, 2016) (recommending, 
among other things, the adoption of certain impartiality provisions). See generally Bremer, supra 
note 44; BARNETT ET AL., supra note 77, at 60–71 (recommending the adoption of numerous 
impartiality provisions). 
275. David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100 (2018). 
276. Id. at 113. 
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providing lobbyists with better oversight of legislators’ behavior; or 
offering transparency as a sufficient, yet unobtrusive, regulatory device 
in the place of meaningful substantive regulation.277 For my purposes 
here, I assume that Pozen is correct in categorizing the nature of 
transparency’s drift and uses. 
Impartiality disclosures, however, would further beneficial goals. 
Impartiality disclosures’ raison d’être is to encourage a professional 
adjudicator corps and provide an impartial tribunal for all parties. The 
disclosures would not easily become tools to undermine agency action 
(except to the extent that a badly designed adjudicatory process should 
not function). Regulated parties would not be able to use numerous 
burdensome requests for disclosure to hamper an agency (as under 
FOIA) because the proposed impartiality disclosure only requires 
agencies to disclose the nature of their hearing officers initially and 
revise them if necessary. Finally, aside from policymaking that 
incidentally adheres in designing agency hearings, these disclosures do 
not concern the substance of any particular decision or seek to replace 
any kind of substantive regulatory policy. Accordingly, problems 
associated with legislator oversight, open meetings, and consumer 
disclosure regimes do not exist here as to specific, substantive 
regulation. 
CONCLUSION 
Impartiality disclosures are a relatively low-cost way of providing 
significant information to scholars, litigants, Congress, and agencies 
themselves about the current state of administrative adjudication. They 
provide a mechanism for obtaining complete and updated data for 
proceedings that are often forgotten or confused with others. As the 
findings reported here demonstrate, agency practice is extremely diverse 
and likely far from optimal. Disclosures may prove sufficient by 
themselves to alter agency behavior and bring us closer to optimal 
impartiality in administrative adjudication. Or they may serve as a tool 
for considering whether and to what extent Congress should promulgate 
government-wide impartiality protections for non-ALJs. After all, 
ACUS and scholars have already provided significant theoretical 
guidance on how agencies should think about adjudicatory 
impartiality.278 What is needed now is action. The time has come to 
                                                     
277. See id. at 123–40. 
278. See supra note 274. 
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move away from some kind of hearing officer and toward an optimal 
one, using impartiality disclosures as a first step. 
Today’s political climate presents a prime opportunity for using 
impartiality disclosures. The Trump Administration has begun altering 
ALJs’ protections as to hiring and, if the courts agree, to removal. In 
short, ALJs are beginning to look more like non-ALJs. And the 
Administration has proposed altering the performance review of one 
group of non-ALJs—immigration judges—by permitting more agency 
oversight and rendering removal of those judges easier. As the 
Administration begins altering non-ALJ’s impartiality protections, it is 
imperative that transparent, up-to-date information exist so that litigants 
in agency proceedings and Congress know of the changes and are able to 
place those changes in context. As administrative adjudication gains 
public attention, impartiality disclosures can, for once, help the public 
focus not only on its foibles—but also its ability to provide fair, efficient 
proceedings. 
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